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ABSTRACT 
What determines a subnational government’s participation in lobbying the 
federal government? Why do some subnational governments invest more resources in 
lobbying the federal government than others? Given a multi-level federalist government 
structure in the United States, how do the lobbying decisions of local governments affect 
the lobbying decisions of state governments? Extant research in social science has 
widely discussed the dynamics of lobbying in the private sector. However, governments 
lobby governments, too. In the United States, intergovernmental lobbying is an 
important strategy for subnational governments to obtain resources from and influence 
policies in a higher-level government. Hundreds of subnational governments directly 
lobby the federal government and thousands of local governments choose to lobby their 
state governments each year. Yet, extant research offers little theoretical leverage and 
even less systematic empirical evidence on what happens when governments lobby 
governments. The major research goal of this dissertation is to identify and 
systematically test the determinants of subnational decisions regarding lobbying the 
federal government on the supply side of public goods. 
The dissertation mainly consists of three quantitative essays that focus on the 
formal lobbying activities of subnational governments. The first essay, “Executive 
Institutions and Formal Lobbying Activities of American City Governments,” points out 
that, compared to city governments with political executives, city governments with 
professional executives are more likely to participate in and spend on hiring professional 
 iii 
 
lobbyists to lobby the federal government. The second essay, “Legislative 
Professionalism and State Formal Lobbying Activities,” provides evidence that 
legislative professionalism contributes to state lobbying activities. The third essay, 
“Bottom-Up Federalism of Formal Lobbying Spending,” borrows the theory of bottom-
up federalism in policy diffusion literature and shows when local governments within a 
state increase their investments in formally lobbying the federal government, the state 
government increases its investment in formally lobbying the federal government, too. 
This dissertation contributes to public administration, public policy, and political science 
literature by offering theoretical and empirical insights into the supply-side factors that 
influence subnational policymaking, intergovernmental relations, and democratic 
representation. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
Lobbying refers to “the transfer of information in private meetings and venues 
between interest groups and politicians, their staffs, and agents” (De Figueiredo and 
Richter 2014). To achieve the goal of influencing public officials, interest groups can 
either hire professional lobbyists or lobby them directly (Gray and Lowery 1996; Walker 
1983, 1991). More than 900 subnational governments have annually spent around 70 
million dollars on hiring professional lobbyists to make lobbying contacts with federal 
officials in Washington in recent years (see Figure I-1 and Figure I-2). In general, 
intergovernmental lobbying1 has become an important strategy for subnational 
governments to obtain resources from and influence policies in the federal government 
(Martin 1990; Nixon 1944; Pelissero and England 1987). 
Nevertheless, the lobbying activities of subnational governments remain poorly 
understood. The following questions still have not been adequately explored and 
explained: What determines a subnational government’s participation in lobbying the 
federal government? Why do some subnational governments invest more resources in 
lobbying the federal government than others? Given a multi-level federalist government 
structure in the United States, how do the lobbying decisions of local governments affect 
the lobbying decisions of state governments? The major research goal of this dissertation 
                                                
1 In this dissertation, intergovernmental lobbying only refers to the lobbying contacts between 
different governments and does not include interbranch lobbying within a government unless 
otherwise stated. 
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is to shed new light on these questions by identifying and systematically testing the 
determinants of subnational lobbying decisions on the supply side of public goods.  
 
 
 
Figure I-1 The Annual Number of Subnational Governments that Lobbied the 
Federal Government 
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Figure I-2 The Annual Federal Lobbying Spending of Subnational Governments 
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intergovernmental lobbying can help us form a better understanding of government 
policymaking, fiscal efficiency, and intergovernmental relations (Jensen 2018), 
important theoretical topics in public administration, public policy, and political science. 
On the normative side, intergovernmental lobbying may significantly affect 
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subnational governments tend to have the incentives to influence the process of 
intergovernmental resource allocation through lobbying, the current democratic 
representation system might also favor certain subnational governments and strengthen 
political, economic, and social inequity across jurisdictions. Finally, on the practice side, 
as previous literature shows, some subnational governments tend to have an undue 
advantage over other governments regarding lobbying (Goldstein and You 2017; Payson 
Forthcoming). A theoretical and empirical analysis of the determinants of 
intergovernmental lobbying can help reformers more effectively regulate lobbying 
activities and limit the unequal distribution of access to federal officials among 
subnational governments.  
 
Literature Review 
There are two general approaches to studying lobbying in the existing literature. 
The first approach focuses on the strategies or consequences of lobbying. For instance, 
formal theorists have modeled lobbying as vote buying, informative signaling, or 
legislative subsidy (Hall and Deardorff 2006). Empiricists have tested the effects of 
lobbying on policy decisions, earmark appropriations or shareholder value (Borisov, 
Goldman and Gupta 2016; De Figueiredo and Silverman 2006; Haeder and Yackee 
2015; Kollman 1997; Yackee 2006; Yackee and Yackee 2006). Normative researchers 
argue that interest group politics could undermine political equity and the interests of 
broad publics (Hayes 1981, 1992; Schlozman 1984). 
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The second approach to studying lobbying focuses on the origins of lobbying 
activities. For instance, from the perspective of collective action, Olson (1965) points out 
that lobbying activities are the by-products of organizations that are designed for other 
economic or social functions. Particularly, these organizations should “(1) have the 
authority and capacity to be coercive, or (2) have a source of positive inducements that 
they can offer the individuals in a latent group (Olson 1965, p. 133).” Similarly, based 
on Hirschman’s (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty (EVL) framework, Clark, Golder, and 
Golder (2017) develop a formal model and provide another explanation for citizens' 
choices of lobbying. Their EVL model with complete information suggests that 
sufficiently powerful citizens (with credible exit threat) need not lobby because the 
government has already allocated enough resources to them. The citizens that lack power 
(without credible exit threat) choose not to lobby because they know that the government 
will ignore them.  
These explanations, although mainly developed based on private groups’ 
lobbying activities and simplistic assumptions, provide us with important insights into 
the incentives behind lobbying activities. Nevertheless, we still need to account for the 
specific institutional incentives, capacity, and opportunities in the public sector if we 
want to develop an intuitive explanation for the activities of intergovernmental lobbying.  
Although much less scholarly attention is paid to public lobbying compared to 
private lobbying, qualitative research on intergovernmental lobbying has persisted for 
decades. For instance, American politics researchers have provided broad descriptions of 
the lobbying function of the big seven (including the U.S. Conference of Mayors or 
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USCM, the International City/County Management Association or ICMA, the National 
Leagues of Cities or NLC, the National Governors’ Conference or NGC, the National 
Association of Counties or NAC, the Council of State Governments or CSG, and the 
National Conference of State Legislatures or NCSL) or subnational governments’ 
lobbying offices in Washington, D.C. (Brooks 1961; Cammisa 1995; Farkas 1971; 
Haider 1974; Hays 1991; Herian 2011; Jensen 2016; Jensen and Emery 2011; Palazzolo 
and McCarthy 2005). These qualitative studies may help us understand the history or 
operations of government lobbying activities, but they cannot help us systematically 
identify the determinants of government lobbying decisions with rigorous and explicit 
research design. The general lack of quantitative research further limits the development 
of theoretical explanations for intergovernmental lobbying and our understanding of 
more general topics, such as subnational government decisions, fiscal efficiency, 
intergovernmental interactions, and socioeconomic equity.  
Some quantitative studies on intergovernmental lobbying have appeared in recent 
years due to the increasing availability of professional lobbying data. After the U.S. 
Congress approved the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) in 1995, all professional 
lobbying contacts with an expense higher than 10, 000 dollars were required to be 
registered. The Clerk of the United States House of Representatives (CUSHR) and the 
Secretary of the United States Senate (SUSS) are responsible for the registration, filing, 
and compilation of reports submitted by the lobbyists (Straus 2017).2 Some watchdog 
                                                
2 The searchable LDA database of the Clerk of the House: 
http://disclosures.house.gov/ld/ldsearch.aspx Date accessed: August 25, 2018. 
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organizations (e.g., Center for Responsive Politics or CRP) collected, digitized and 
classified millions of these lobbying reports and created a publicly available lobbying 
database.3 Based on CRP’s database, Loftis and Kettler (2015) analyze the lobbying 
activities of 498 cities between 1998 and 2008 and find that economic distress (measured 
by city unemployment rate) pushes cities to lobby the federal government and the 
competitiveness of congressional districts is positively associated with lobbying 
spending. Goldstein and You (2017) build a dataset of cities with populations over 25, 
000 between 1999 and 2012 and argue that the underprovision of public goods increases 
cities’ participation and investment in lobbying the federal government. Payson 
(Forthcoming) analyzes a dataset of all cities in 50 states with a population over 1, 000 
in 2007 and 2012 and a dataset of 467 cities in California from 2002 to 2015, and finds 
that cities’ participation in lobbying the state governments increase state transfer to cities 
by around 8%. 
The existing explanations for government lobbying choices are mainly proposed 
on the demand side of local public goods. For instance, both Loftis and Kettler (2015) 
and Goldstein and You (2017) argue that local governments increase their lobbying 
investments because they need to pursue extra resources from the federal government to 
meet the demands of local citizens. However, presumably, every rational subnational 
government would prefer more resources from the federal government despite the level 
                                                                                                                                           
The searchable LDA database of the Secretary of the Senate: 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/Public_Disclosure/LDA_reports.htm Date accessed: August 
25, 2018. 
3 Center for Responsive Politics: https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ Date accessed: March 1, 
2018. 
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of public demands. Why do not all cities choose to lobby? Why do some subnational 
governments invest more resources in lobbying the federal government than others? A 
key unstated assumption behind these demand-based explanations is that local 
governments serve as a unitary actor that only seeks to satisfy public demands. 
Therefore, the incentives and constraints of policymakers on the supply side of local 
public goods are ignored. Besides demand-based explanations, we need supply-side 
explanations to fully answer these questions. The goal of this dissertation is to develop 
and test supply-side explanations. 
Further, there are two types of lobbying activities: formal and informal (Jensen 
2018). Formal lobbying refers to the process that clients hire professional lobbyists to 
make lobbying contacts with government officials. For instance, LDA defines a lobbyist 
as an individual who makes at least a lobbying contact in a quarterly period, is 
compensated, and spends at least 20% of her time on lobbying activities (Straus 2015). 
Informal lobbying refers to the process that clients directly contact government officials 
through informal contacts, such as private letters, phone calls or meetings.4 Previous 
empirical research tends not to explicitly differentiate between formal and informal 
lobbying activities (e.g., Goldstein and You 2017; Loftis and Kettler 2015), and ignores 
the possibility that the independent variables may have differential impacts on formal or 
informal lobbying activities. The fact that the theoretical concept of lobbying is much 
                                                
4 “Incidental lobbying” or “shadow lobbying” (as commonly defined by national and state 
lobbying laws) may also be viewed as a form of informal lobbying since they refer to the 
activities that a person engages in lobbying activities for only a few hours or makes only a few 
lobbying expenditures and, therefore, is not required to register as a lobbyist (Akiashvili et al. 
2018; LaPira 2015). 
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broader than the operationalized measure of formal lobbying in previous research also 
suggests that previous empirical analysis may suffer from the unstated problems of 
measurement errors or omitted variable bias. 
This dissertation explicitly limits the analysis of intergovernmental lobbying to 
formal lobbying to avoid unnecessary theoretical or empirical confusion. There are 
several reasons for this choice. First, it is difficult (or impossible) to systematically 
collect and analyze informal lobbying activities, as the participants of informal lobbying 
are not likely to publicly report the details of their activities. By contrast, studying 
formal lobbying activities is a more practical way of conducting systematic analysis and 
statistical inference and gaining convincing theoretical or empirical insights. 
Second, in general, despite its lower visibility in politics, informal lobbying may 
also not be as effective as formal lobbying. Federal officials tend to have limited 
knowledge of each specific policy issue, and limited attention, time or resources to be 
allocated for various policy issues (Alesina and Tabellini 2007, 2008; Wilensky 2015). 
A direct informal contact with a federal official may serve the function of political 
signaling. However, these informal contacts are not likely to have a substantive effect 
without hiring professional lobbyists, who are familiar with federal policy issues, policy 
schedules and have abundant political contacts, to provide the corresponding legislative 
subsidy (see more discussion later). Of course, the existence of informal lobbying can 
create some empirical concerns (e.g., measurement error or omitted variable bias) for the 
analysis of formal lobbying activities. I will address these issues in later chapters.  
 
10 
Qualitative Observations 
Understanding how lobbying works in practice is important in developing 
theoretical arguments and implementing the design of empirical research (De Figueiredo 
and Richter 2014). Therefore, to substantiate my understanding of professional lobbying 
activities in practice, I went to Washington D.C. to observe how local officials lobby 
federal officials with the help of professional lobbyists in the Spring of 2018. Thanks to 
the opportunity recommended by Dr. Manuel P. Teodoro, I conducted a series of field 
observations and qualitative interviews with local officials and professional lobbyists 
from private lobbying firms,5 which helped me form a deeper understanding of 
intergovernmental lobbying with the first-hand experience.  
A common myth of the professional lobbying industry might be that lobbyists 
spend most of their time having fancy dinners with politicians and trying to shape 
politicians’ policy positions immediately through direct persuasion or interest exchange. 
However, in real life, most professional lobbyists have to spend most of their time 
researching legislation or administrative matters, strategy sessions, telephone calls, and 
preparation for lobbying communications. Lobbyists also need to figure out the 
congressional policy schedule (e.g., the expiration date of bills), federal officials or 
5 The Human Research Protection Program (HRPP) at Texas A&M University determined on 
05/10/2018 that this research meets the criteria for exemption in accordance with 45 CFR 
46.101(b) under Category 2: “Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, 
diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of 
public behavior unless, the information is obtained in an identifiable manner and any disclosure 
of the subjects responses outside of research could reasonably place the subject at risk.” IRB ID: 
IRB2018-0430M. Reference Number: 075503. 
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staffs’ personal schedule, funding availability, and federal officials’ policy positions. In 
fact, according to my interviews, private lobbyists that work for local governments tend 
to identify themselves as “babysitters” or “city employees.” 
Moreover, as politicians are extremely busy (e.g., floor votes, committee votes, 
or hundreds of meeting requests a day) and do not have enough knowledge on specific 
policy issues, the most common form of lobbying occurs through delivering policy 
information or proposals to the staffs working in politicians’ office. For instance, during 
my trip on the Capitol Hill, I observed that local officials from Texas only had 30 
seconds to take a photo with Senator John Cornyn during the Senators’ weekly meeting 
with his supporters, called Texas Thursday Coffee.6 During the typical formal lobbying 
process, local officials and lobbyists only have around 15 minutes to communicate 
policy messages (e.g., policy background, actions requested, suggested legislative 
language, and issue importance in each federal official’s electoral district) with a staff 
assistant, legislative correspondent, or legislative director from the office of a 
representative or a Senator.7  
The legislative staffs who work for the federal officials tend to have professional 
knowledge regarding a specific policy issue and they are the ones who really draft the 
policy documents for federal officials. Therefore, a direct lobbying contact with a 
legislative staff is not necessarily less effective than direct communication with a federal 
official. Of course, lobbyists need to adjust lobbying languages and strategies based on 
                                                
6 A photo can be found here: https://twitter.com/txawwa/status/986974759551422465. Date 
posted on Twitter: April 19, 2018. 
7 As Baumgartner et al. (2009, p. 22) suggest, “Attention in Washington is scarce.” 
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the characteristics of each congressional district and the policy position of each federal 
official. However, an informal common rule of the formal lobbying process is that the 
conversations between local officials, lobbyists, and legislative staffs should stay on the 
main policy message and does not include campaign donations or other topics that may 
imply direct interest exchange.  
Based on these field observations and qualitative interviews, I notice that 
professional lobbying service has several typical characteristics. First, the price of hiring 
a professional lobbyist is closely associated with his or her political connections or 
policy expertise. Due to this reason, many lobbyists choose to work as a staff in the 
Congress to establish political connections before they work for the lobbying firms. 
Also, lobbyists tend to have an academic degree in political science, public policy, or 
economics and they spend years studying one or several specific policy issues (e.g., 
transportation, education, or defense) and become experts on these issues in Washington 
politics.  
Second, hiring professional lobbyists involve transaction costs for the clients. 
Information asymmetry is commonplace in the lobbying market. Simply paying a 
lobbyist a lump sum and ask him or her to lobby may lead to moral hazard such as the 
2006 Jack Abramoff Native American Lobbying Scandal, in which lobbyists 
successfully overbilled and then secretly lobbied against their clients due to the lack of 
supervision (Abramoff 2011). Besides the direct cost of hiring a lobbyist, a client often 
needs to spend additional time and resources identifying an appropriate lobbyist with 
relevant expertise and connections, negotiating a price, coordinating with a lobbyist in 
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terms of designing policy proposals or making lobbying contacts and monitoring the 
activities of a lobbyist.  
Third, the professional lobbying service does not guarantee a quick payoff. Based 
on my own observations in D.C. and the existing literature (Kingdon 1984; Nownes 
2006; Straus 2015), I realize that the most direct purpose of lobbying is to keep federal 
officials informed of local government policy issues (i.e., brand building) and to track 
their sentiment for certain issues. The choice of lobbying issues depends on 
congressional schedules or the emergence of “policy windows,” such as the expiration 
date of bills (e.g. farm bill renews in every five years) and funding availability. In 
general, the benefits of professional lobbying tend to be produced in the long run.  
Although this qualitative evidence does not directly constitute my empirical 
essays, they, combined with qualitative evidence in existing lobbying literature, provide 
necessary contextual information for my research topic. More importantly, this 
qualitative evidence helps me develop logically consistent and empirically convincing 
theoretical arguments and research designs throughout my dissertation. 
 
Overview of Chapters  
This dissertation provides theoretical and empirical evidence that supply-side 
factors matter in intergovernmental lobbying. Specifically, in Chapter II, I propose that, 
compared to cities with political executives (i.e., mayor-council cities), cities with 
professional executives (i.e., council-manager cities) are more likely to participate in and 
spend more money on hiring professional lobbyists to lobby the federal officials. In 
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terms of motivations, compared to the political executives, professional executives have 
longer time horizon or a lower discount rate due to their job stability and lifelong career, 
thus having higher expected returns on lobbying investment. Meanwhile, compared to 
the political executives whose attention is largely concentrated on reelections, 
professional executives are more capable of overcoming the transaction costs involved in 
lobbying (e.g., identifying local policy demands or coordinating with lobbyists and 
federal officials to prepare policy proposals) due to their previous professional training 
and experience in public policy and government management. An analysis of more than 
1,200 cities between 1999 and 2012 confirms the key hypotheses. 
In Chapter III, I argue that legislative professionalism is positively associated 
with state governments’ participation or investments in formally lobbying the federal 
government. More professional state legislatures have more political channels to collect 
information from voters and are more likely to represent the preferences of the median 
voters. Thus, state policymakers in a highly professional state legislature are more likely 
to allocate resources for lobbying the federal government to pursue additional federal 
resources to meet the demands of median voters. In addition, state governments with a 
high level of legislative professionalism will have more resources necessary for 
overcoming the transaction costs involved in employing professional lobbyists and thus 
have more access to lobbying service. I support the hypotheses with evidence from a 
panel dataset covering all 50 states from 1999 to 2011.  
In Chapter IV, building on Shipan and Volden’s (2006) analysis of local-to-state 
policy diffusion, I point out that bottom-up federalism also exists in intergovernmental 
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formal lobbying and the intensity of local governments lobbying the federal government 
may have two distinct types of impacts on the intensity of state governments lobbying 
the federal government: the snowball effect and the pressure valve effect. Regarding the 
snowball effect, local lobbying spending may increase state lobbying spending through 
increasing the salience of lobbying as a policy tool, producing negative externalities 
among local governments, or escalating the competition for scarce federal funding 
between state and local governments. With respect to the pressure valve effect, local 
lobbying spending may decrease state lobbying spending by obtaining additional 
resources to successfully meet the demands of local voters and groups and, therefore, 
decreasing the policy pressures on state-level policymakers. Using a dataset of all 50 
states from 1999 to 2011, I find evidence that local lobbying spending increases state 
lobbying spending (through a snowball effect) after controlling for political, financial, 
and demographic characteristics. 
In Chapter V, I conclude this dissertation by highlighting the main findings, 
discussing theoretical and practical implications, and pointing out the potential directions 
for future research. 
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CHAPTER II  
EXECUTIVE INSTITUTIONS AND FORMAL LOBBYING ACTIVITIES OF 
AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENTS 
Introduction 
Lobbying refers to "the transfer of information in private meetings and venues 
between interest groups and politicians, their staffs, and agents" (De Figueiredo and 
Richter 2014). The right of individuals, groups, and corporations to lobby the federal 
government was supported by the founding fathers of the United States such as James 
Madison in the Federalist Papers in 1788 and later formally protected by the right to 
petition in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1791. To achieve 
the goal of influencing public officials, interest groups can either informally lobby them 
directly or formally hire professional lobbyists (Gray and Lowery 2000).  
Local governments are active players in the process of formally lobbying the 
American federal government. In the last ten years, at least 300 city governments 
submitted at least one formal lobbying report under the Lobbying Disclosure Act each 
year. These local governments have spent tens of millions of dollars on formally 
lobbying the federal government annually. Like interest groups in the private sector, 
local governments have their own special interests in terms of funding, policies, or 
autonomy (Farkas 1971). In general, intergovernmental formal lobbying has become an 
important strategy for subnational governments to obtain resources from and influence 
policies in the federal government. Nevertheless, the dynamics behind local 
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governments lobbying decisions remain poorly understood, and the following questions 
still have not been adequately explored and explained: What determines a local 
government’s participation in formally lobbying the federal government? Why do some 
local governments invest more resources in formally lobbying the federal government 
than others?  
Understanding intergovernmental formal lobbying is important in both 
theoretical and practical senses. As a form of intergovernmental interaction, formal 
lobbying can potentially influence the relations between different governments. The 
exploration of local governments’ participation and investment in intergovernmental 
formal lobbying can provide scholarly foundations for identifying the origins of 
intergovernmental relations. Moreover, different from typical local public projects (e.g., 
parks, roads or schools), lobbying activities are largely invisible and lobbying benefits 
are highly uncertain and tend to be produced in the long run. Studying local leaders’ 
decisions on intergovernmental formal lobbying can shed new light on how and why 
local governments allocate resources for this type of expenditure. Further, 
intergovernmental formal lobbying may determine who have more voice in national 
politics and shapes the operation of democratic representation8 and the distribution of 
federal resources in the country. Therefore, intergovernmental formal lobbying may 
significantly influence social equity. 
                                                
8 E.g., the roles of paid representation versus elected representation in shaping the legitimacy of 
government. 
 18 
 
Previous interest group literature mainly focuses on the negotiations between 
citizens (including individuals, private business groups and non-profit organizations) or 
negotiations between citizens and governments, and treat local governments as if they 
were just another interest groups composed of citizens (Dekel, Jackson, and Wolinsky 
2009; Olson 1965; Stigler 1971) and, therefore, do not provide a contextual perspective 
for explaining intergovernmental lobbying. With the recently available formal lobbying 
database, systematic analysis of lobbying activities by local governments has received 
increased attention in recent years (Goldstein and You 2017; Loftis and Kettler 2015). 
These studies tend to assume that local governments are unitary actors that only seek to 
satisfy public demands and argue that the local socioeconomic demands directly 
determine governments’ investments in lobbying. Nevertheless, this organizational-level 
demand-based explanation lacks theoretical plausibility. Presumably, every rational local 
government would prefer more resources from the federal government despite the level 
of public demands. Why do not all local governments choose to lobby? Why do some 
local governments invest more in lobbying the federal government than others?  
To further improve our understanding of the determinants of intergovernmental 
lobbying, this work provides an explanation on the supply side of local public goods that 
illustrates the institutional incentives and constraints of local government executives 
when making lobbying decisions. To achieve this goal, I first point out that formal or 
professional lobbying services have three characteristics: The clients have definite 
inputs; the outputs tend to be produced in the long run as lobbying requires repeated 
interactions to build mutual trust; the lobbying process involves a high level of 
 19 
 
transaction costs for the clients, such as finding an appropriate lobbyist, coordinating 
with the lobbyist (e.g., communicating with a lobbyist concerning lobbying strategy), 
and monitoring the behaviors of the lobbyist.  
On this basis, I focus on how executive institutions shape the motivations and 
expertise of local government executives regarding formal lobbying. American city 
government executives can be classified into two main types: Political executives (e.g., 
mayors) who are directly elected by constituents in mayor-council cities; and 
professional executives (e.g., city managers) who are hired by city councils in council-
manger cities.  
Given the first two characteristics of formal lobbying, compared to political 
executives, professional executives have more motivations to invest resources in 
lobbying the federal government. The careers of political executives are determined by 
short-term elections and are less stable. Political executives have strong incentives to 
opportunistically pursue short-term and highly visible projects instead of formally 
lobbying another government. By contrast, professional executives tend to have a 
relatively stable and lifelong career and therefore have a lower discount rate in terms of 
lobbying activities. Given the third characteristic of formal lobbying, compared to 
political executives, professional executives have a lower transaction cost in terms of 
making lobbying decisions due to their more professional training and richer 
administration experience. Therefore, I hypothesize that other things being equal, 
compared to cities with political executives, cities with professional executives are more 
likely to participate in and invest resources in lobbying the federal government. 
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The empirical analysis is based on a dataset of more than 1200 American cities 
with more than 25,000 people between 1999 and 2012. The results show that all else 
equal, cities with professional executives are 40% more likely to participate in formally 
lobbying the federal government than cities with political executives; compared to cities 
with political executives, cities with professional executives are associated with 208% 
increases in formal lobbying spending. I also check the robustness of these findings by 
conducting a series of additional analysis in terms of alternative measurements or model 
specifications. 
This work proceeds as follows. First, I present a brief review of the lobbying 
literature. Second, I provide theoretical discussions and propose the two key hypotheses 
about the relationship between executive institutions and formal lobbying participation 
or formal lobbying investment. Third, I describe the research method, data collection, 
and variable measures.  Fourth, I conduct empirical tests of two hypotheses and report 
the results of statistical models.  Finally, I conclude by discussing the implications of 
this research and making suggestions for future research. 
 
Literature Review 
Scholars generally employ two approaches to studying lobbying in the existing 
literature. The first approach focuses on the strategies or consequences of lobbying. For 
instance, formal theorists have modeled lobbying as vote buying, informative signaling, 
or legislative subsidy (Hall and Deardorff 2006). Empiricists have tested the effects of 
lobbying on policy decisions, earmark appropriations or shareholder values (Borisov, 
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Goldman, and Gupta 2016; De Figueiredo and Silverman 2006; Haeder and Yackee 
2015; Kollman 1997; Yackee and Yackee 2006). Normative researchers argue that 
interest group politics could undermine political equity and the interests of broad publics 
(Hayes 1992; Schlozman 1984).  
The second approach to studying lobbying, which is more relevant to this work, 
focuses on the origins of lobbying activities. Researchers have proposed two main 
frameworks for explaining the existence of lobbying. The first explanation focuses on 
negotiations between citizens. From the perspective of collective action, Olson (1965) 
points out that citizens in a large group have little incentive to pay the cost of lobbying to 
obtain a collective benefit. Hence, Olson proposes lobbying activities are the by-
products of organizations that are designed for other economic or social functions. 
Particularly, these organizations should “(1) have the authority and capacity to be 
coercive, or (2) have a source of positive inducements that they can offer the individuals 
in a latent group (Olson 1965, p. 133).”   
The second explanation for lobbying focuses on the negotiations between 
citizens and the federal government. Hirschman (1970) develops an Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty (EVL) framework to theorize the behavioral responses of a citizen to an 
undesirable change in her environment. The choice of “exit” means that a citizen 
changes her behavior to survive in the new environment. The choice of “voice” means 
that a citizen tries to convince the government to improve the environment. The choice 
of “loyalty” means that a citizen totally accepts the undesirable change. Based on the 
EVL framework, Clark, Golder, and Golder (2017) develop a formal model and provide 
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another explanation for citizens’ choices of lobbying. Their EVL model with complete 
information suggests that sufficiently powerful citizens (with credible exit threat) need 
not lobby because the government has already allocated enough resources to them. The 
citizens that lack power (without credible exit threat) choose not to lobby because they 
know that the government will ignore them. Clark, Golder, and Golder (2017) also 
suggest a pooling equilibrium in which both powerful and powerless citizens choose to 
lobby when there is incomplete information on the part of a government.  
However, collective action approach and EVL approach, which was first 
designed to explain the lobbying activities in the private sector, cannot directly provide a 
contextual and intuitive explanation for the activities of intergovernmental formal 
lobbying. Several scholars have attempted to explain the dynamics of intergovernmental 
formal lobbying using recently available systematic data from the Center for Responsive 
Politics.9 Based on a dataset of 498 cities across 45 states from 1998 to 2008, Loftis and 
Kettler (2015) find that cities with economic distress are more likely to lobby the federal 
government and cities in competitive congressional districts spend more on lobbying the 
federal government. Similarly, based on a dataset of cities with populations over 25, 000 
between 1999 and 2012, Goldstein and You (2017) find that the preference divergence 
between city governments and state governments leads to an underprovision of local 
public goods, and, therefore, city governments need to lobby the federal government for 
additional resources.  
                                                
9 Center for Responsive Politics: https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/ Date accessed: March 1, 
2018. 
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Almost all of the previous explanations for intergovernmental formal lobbying 
consider a city government as a unitary actor that only seeks to satisfy local public 
demands or assume that intergovernmental lobbying decisions could be completely 
inferred by observing local socioeconomic characteristics. This assumption, 
nevertheless, lacks theoretical or empirical plausibility. Presumably, every rational local 
government would prefer more resources from the federal government despite the level 
of public demands. Why do not all cities choose to lobby the federal government? Why 
do some local governments invest more resources in lobbying the federal government 
than others? Besides public demands, a useful explanatory framework should also 
consider the factors on the supply side of local public goods that determine the 
incentives of policymakers in city governments, such as local institutions. The main goal 
of this chapter is to answer these questions by providing a supply-side explanation 
underlying the process of intergovernmental formal lobbying. 
 
Executive Institutions and Lobbying Decisions 
Figure II-1 shows the theoretical framework. Generally, the professional 
lobbying service involves three main characteristics. First, the inputs of clients or the 
prices of hiring professional lobbyists are immediate and definite. Professional lobbyists 
are employed because of their knowledge of the “intricacies” of the policy process, 
including “who to talk to, how and when to present an effective argument, and what 
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needs to be done to follow-up.”10 Professional lobbyists provide three types of 
information to government officials, including political information about the status or 
prospect of government decisions, career-related information about government 
officials’ own jobs, and policy-analytic information about the social consequences of 
government decisions (Nownes 2006). Clients have to pay a higher amount of money to 
hire a lobbyist with more connections or a higher level of expertise (Bertrand, 
Bombardini, and Trebbi 2014; McCrain 2018; Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen 2012). In 
the case of formally lobbying the federal government, local governments have to directly 
allocate fiscal resources for signing contracts with professional lobbyists.  
Second, the outputs of formal lobbying tend to be produced in the long run and 
are uncertain (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Nownes 2006). Lobbying is a long-term game 
that requires repeated interactions to build mutual trust between clients, lobbyists, and 
politicians. Most formal lobbying activities occur through providing a government 
official with legislative or policy support rather than direct persuasion or interest 
exchange (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hall and Deardoff 2006). A possible consequence of 
city lobbying is to increase the salience of a local government on the federal policy 
agenda, but it normally does not produce a quick payoff.11 Recent research suggests that 
                                                
10 Association of Government Relations Professionals (AGRP), “Voice of the Lobbying, Public 
Policy, and Advocacy Professions.” Source: http://grprofessionals.org/about-association-
government-relations-professionals Date accessed: July 17, 2018. 
11 Several online interviews with professional lobbyists provide supports for this argument. 
According to Darrell L. Conner, Government Affairs Counselor, K&L Gates: “The ones that 
have done better in the marketplace in DC are the ones that have been actively engaged and 
consistently engaged. You know it’s very difficult to come in to Washington and say ‘you know 
I have a problem, can you help me solve it in three months?’ Washington doesn't really work 
that way. You have an issue. You have to educate people. You have to work through the process 
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endorsements from well-connected interest groups provide a strong cue for federal 
officials with limited information early in the policymaking process (Box-Steffensmeier, 
Christenso, and Craig Forthcoming). Nevertheless, such interest groups have less direct 
effect when bills progress. In fact, lobbyists often produce little change as they meet 
equal opposition to their efforts or there is scarce space on the federal policy agenda 
(Baumgartner et al. 2009).12 In addition, even if the federal government responds to the 
lobbying efforts of a local government with more fiscal or policy support, the supply of 
these federal supports may not exactly match the demands of local governments.  
Third, lobbying activities tend to involve high transaction costs for the clients, 
including broad information costs, bargaining costs, and enforcement costs. For 
example, the information costs include the costs of understanding the requirements of 
local communities, finding an appropriate lobbying firm and determining the firm’s 
conditions. The bargaining costs include the costs of negotiating a price with the 
lobbying firm. The enforcement costs are the costs of coordinating with lobbyists to 
improve the effectiveness of lobbying activities, such as designing lobbying strategies or 
                                                                                                                                           
and that takes time.” Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ge_K89yWLqk Date accessed: 
August 22, 2018 
According to Josh Sanderson, Lobbyist of Association of Texas Professional Educators. “Most 
of the goals that we work on are long term. They are not something that happened overnight. If 
you get frustrated easily, this is very difficult for you to work… Being a lobbyist has been 
described as 99% boredom punctuated by 1% sheer terror…You never know when you are going 
to be called up front in front of a panel of senators to testify in front of 200 people in the 
audience.” Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=swvypvWvinM Date accessed: August 
22, 2018 
12 This does not mean that the efforts of lobbyists are useless as their clients may also benefit 
from the policy status quo. In fact, the most common goal of lobbying is to protect an existing 
policy from a proposed change (Baumgartner et al. 2009). 
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policy proposals. Clients also need to monitor the behaviors of lobbyists to ensure that 
the lobbying firm delivers the service in the promised conditions.13  
   
 
Figure II-1 Executive Institutions and Intergovernmental Formal Lobbying 
Decisions 
 
                                                
13 A cautionary case is the 2006 Jack Abramoff Native American Lobbying Scandal, in which 
lobbyists successfully overbilled and then secretly lobbied against their clients due to the lack of 
supervision (Abramoff 2011).  
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On this basis, this chapter analyzes how executive institutions affect local 
government decisions regarding formal lobbying. Almost all government executives in 
American cities are produced in two ways (Hayes and Chang 1990; Krause et al. 2019). 
First, in mayor-council cities, the government executives are the elected mayors. Second, 
in the council-manager cities, the government executives are the hired professional city 
managers. Both political (i.e., elected mayors) and professional (i.e., city managers) 
executives oversee the general operations of city governments and are widely involved 
in the budgeting, administration, and management of local governments (Svara 1999). 
Particularly, managing intergovernmental relations is a major responsibility of local 
government executives.14 Numerous urban politics literature suggests that executive 
institutions can significantly affect the policy decisions of local governments (Carr 2015; 
Clingermayer and Feiock 2001; Feiock, Jeong, and Kim 2003; Krause et al. 2019; 
Lubell, Feiock and De La Cruz 2009). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that both 
types of government executives can significantly affect cities’ decisions regarding hiring 
professionals to lobby another government. 
Following an institutional rational choice perspective (Weingast 1996; Weingast, 
Shesle, and Johnsen 1981), I make the following two assumptions: 1) Government 
executives are rational in the sense of maximizing their benefits; and 2) institutions 
create incentives and constraints to shape executives’ rational choices. I argue that 
                                                
14 For instance, managing intergovernmental relations is repeatedly listed as a key issue in the 
annual strategic plans of the city manager’s office of College Station, Texas. Source: 
http://www.cstx.gov/index.aspx?page=16 Date accessed: August 8, 2018. In the city of Los 
Angeles, the mayor works with the community liaison office to maintain effective relationships 
with other governments. Source: http://cao.lacity.org/budget/ Date accessed: August 8, 2018. 
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political executives have a cost-benefits decision calculus different from professional 
executives, which determines that they have different motivations and expertise in terms 
of lobbying the federal government. 
Compared to political executives, professional executives tend to have a stronger 
motivation to invest in formal intergovernmental lobbying activities. Political executives 
tend to have a shorter time horizon and a higher discount rate in terms of lobbying 
spending. First, political executives are directly accountable to voters before the next 
election and tend to opportunistically focus on short-term voter demands rather than the 
long-term outputs produced by lobbying (Feiock, Jeong, and Kim 2003). Second, 
political executives and council members are directly elected by voters and, therefore, 
are not accountable to each other, and they can choose to blame each other for 
noncooperation if a city government does not perform well (Mullin, Peele, and Cain 
2004). When the costs of lobbying are immediate, definite and easily visible, while the 
benefits of lobbying less visible and mostly in the future, it is difficult for political 
executives to take credits and easy for them to be attacked by political opponents for 
investing money, resources or time in formal lobbying. Therefore, political executives 
would opportunistically prefer highly visible short-term projects to lowly visible long-
term projects (e.g., lobbying expense) to gain the support of voters (Krause et al. 2019; 
Olson 1993).  
By contrast, professional executives tend to have a longer and more stable career 
(Zhang 2007), and, therefore, have a lower discount rate regarding lobbying benefits. 
Although there is no systematic data on the tenure of all city managers and mayors in the 
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United States in the past decades, the existing research does provide some small-sample 
evidence to suggest that city managers generally have longer tenures than mayors. For 
instance, based on a dataset of 120 cities, Ammons and Bosse (2005) find that the 
average tenure of city managers is around 7 years and keeps increasing after the 1980s. 
City managers also often negotiate with the city councils for severance protection (i.e., 
financial protection from termination without cause) or protection from termination 
before or after a local election to increase councils’ cost to terminate city managers and 
avoid career risk (Connolly 2016). By contrast, McNitt (2010) finds that mayoral tenure 
is only around 6 years in 19 major cities.   
Moreover, without being directly accountable to voters before the next election, 
professional managers’ decisions are relatively insulated from the voters and can be 
made in a consistent manner (Feiock, Jeong, and Kim 2003). Existing research shows 
that professional managers are relatively insensitive to the demands of the elected 
politicians and more often lead their elected politicians to the “right” policy in the 
broader professional community (Teodoro 2011). Furthermore, different from the 
political executives, who only serve as one (rather than multiple) city’s government 
executives in their career as a politician, professional executives have a bigger job 
market and they can move from one city to another city. In the national labor market, 
they have to serve two clients (Connolly 2016; Teodoro 2011): The current client who 
pays their salary and the potential client who may pay their salary in the future. 
Therefore, this stronger job predictability and wider job mobility determine that city 
managers have a longer time horizon in terms of making lobbying decisions. To 
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maintain or improve their career in the long run, professional executives will choose to 
allocate resources for lobbying the federal government even if it is difficult to achieve a 
quick payoff.  
In terms of expertise, compared to political executives, professional executives 
have a lower transaction cost when involved in lobbying the federal government. The 
decisions of public executives are significantly influenced by their knowledge, skills, 
and experience (Lynn 1987). To improve the effectiveness of formal lobbying, 
government executives can take advantage of their policy knowledge and administration 
experience to facilitate the process of choosing lobbying issues, making lobbying plans, 
signing lobbying contracts, and coordinating with professional lobbyists, etc. Political 
executives are usually relatively inexperienced in terms of policy or administration when 
they assume offices, as their previous backgrounds tend to be highly heterogeneous and 
less related to public sector management. Also, local electoral campaigns occupy a 
significant share of political executives’ time, staff, and resources. Therefore, political 
executives tend to have less professional experience or knowledge necessary for 
facilitating the formal lobbying process. 
Professional executives, by contrast, receive professional career training (e.g., 
Bachelor of Public Administration, Master of Public Administration or Master of Public 
Policy) and have multiple years of municipal management experience before they are 
hired as city managers (Carr 2015). As full-time professionals, professional executives 
accumulate considerable knowledge, skill and administration experience (e.g., local 
policy issues, funding methods, and bureaucratic communication or control skills), 
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which are important for determining the needs of lobbying in cities and the bureaucratic 
resources required for lobbying. Many existing survey studies have shown that city 
managers devote more of their time on policy and administration than elected mayors 
(Carr 2015). Therefore, even if a political executive and a professional executive have 
the same motivation and resources for lobbying the federal government, the professional 
executive can more effectively facilitate the lobbying process. 
My theory is an extension of Hall and Deardorff’s (2006) model of lobbying as a 
legislative subsidy. Hall and Dearforff (2006) review previous literature and argue that 
lobbying is neither interest exchange nor direct persuasion, but a form of legislative 
subsidy.15 They point out that lobbying is “a matching grant of policy information, 
political intelligence, and legislative labor to the enterprises of strategically selected 
legislators. (p. 69)” The objective of lobbying is to reduce the cost of making legislative 
progress for natural allies.  
Based on Hall and Deardorff’s (2006) model, my main theoretical arguments can 
be summarized in Figure II-2 and II-3. Consistent with consumer choice theory, a 
rational legislator has to allocate his or her efforts between target issue A and other 
policy issues under limited resources, such as time, information, labor and agenda space. 
This situation is represented by the budget function in Figure II-2 and II-3. Given the 
                                                
15 This statement is also supported by recent research in Canada. Cooper and Boucher 
(Forthcoming) use the information from Canadian Lobbyists Registry from 2008 to 2018 to 
show that lobbying intensity is positively associated with issue information uncertainty but 
negatively associated with policy objective uncertainty. This finding implies that professional 
lobbyists mainly aim to provide information subsidy rather than directly influence the positions 
of politicians. 
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common assumption of diminishing marginal rates of substitution in consumer choice 
theory, the legislator’s willingness to pay for progress on policy issues can be 
represented by the smooth and convex indifference curves. The point of tangency 
between the budget line and an indifference curve is the optimal allocation of a 
legislator’s effort. The effect of lobbying is to improve the effort of a legislator at 
making progress toward target issue A. 
What happens when local governments lobby the federal government in Hall and 
Deardorff’s model? My theoretical analysis of executive motivations shows that because 
professional executives have a lower discount rate (𝛿) in terms of lobbying benefits, they 
have a higher expected return on progress on target issue A than political executives (as 
shown in Figure II-2). On the other hand, other things being equal (e.g, fixed investment 
or 𝜏), city managers’ lobbying efforts should be more effective than mayors due to their 
lower level of transaction costs during lobbying process (as shown in Figure II-3). In 
other words, it’s easier for professional managers to push the budget line to the right. In 
both cases, professional executives should have more incentives to allocate resources for 
formally lobbying the federal government than political executives. 
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Figure II-2 Effects of Executive Motivation 
Note: 𝛿 represents the discount rate of a city government executive. 
 
 
 
Figure II-3 Effects of Executive Expertise 
Note: τ represents the fixed amount of investment of a city government.  
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All of the above analysis leads to the same conclusion: other things being equal, 
compared to cities with political executives, cities with professional executives are more 
likely to invest resources in formally lobbying the federal government. Therefore, I have 
the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Compared to cities with political executives, cities with 
professional executives are more likely to participate in formally lobbying the 
federal government. 
Hypothesis 2: Compared to cities with political executives, cities with 
professional executives invest more resources in formally lobbying the federal 
government.  
Data and Method 
Ideally, to test this chapter’s key arguments, each city’s participation in lobbying 
other governments and each city’s overall spending on lobbying other governments 
could be potentially used as the dependent variables. However, most cities’ annual 
financial reports do not directly list the amount of money spent on lobbying and there is 
not an established database on this specific topic. Although cities’ investments in 
lobbying the state governments are generally available on each state’s website, the data 
are hard to collect and the variations in disclosure requirements (e.g., different 
compensation, reimbursement, or expenditure thresholds) makes lobbying data from 
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different states difficult to compare.16 Therefore, in this study, I examine the impact of 
executive institutions on cities’ lobbying decisions by focusing on cities’ lobbying 
activities at the federal level. The main reason is that LDA requires all interest groups 
who contribute more than 10, 000 dollars to lobbying the federal government to file 
lobbying disclosure reports, 17 and Center for Responsive Politics has standardized these 
data to make them available for statistical analysis. 
The main dataset is developed based on Goldstein and You (2017). The dataset 
covers cities with populations greater than 25, 000 between 1999 and 2012. The unit of 
analysis is a city-year. The original sample includes 1, 262 unique “cities.” However, a 
closer examination of the dataset shows that 3 of the sampled units are census tracts or 
counties instead of cities with a general-purpose government18 and, therefore, the 
research sample only includes 1, 259 cities. 
There are two dependent variables of interest. I set the first dependent variable as 
a dummy equal to 1 if a city submits a federal lobbying report in a year, and 0 if 
otherwise. I employ logit models to predict the binary dependent variable. The second 
dependent variable of interest captures the number of resources a city government 
invests in lobbying the federal government. It is measured with the natural log of the 
                                                
16 Dr. Julia Payson from New York University was systematically collecting state-level lobbying 
data for her book project Buy Representation: The Political Economy of Intergovernmental 
Lobbying in 2018, but her dataset was not publicly released at the time of this analysis.  
17 Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives. “Lobbying Disclosure Act Guidance.” 
Source: https://lobbyingdisclosure.house.gov/amended_lda_guide.html#section1 Date accessed: 
January 24, 2018. 
18 These areas include Montgomery in Maryland, Huntington Station in New York, and 
Boardman in Ohio. 
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level of lobbying expense due to the highly skewed distribution (see Figure II-4; 
Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta 2016). Given the non-negative nature of the dependent 
variable and LDA only requires the registration of any organization that contributes 
more than $ 10,000 towards lobbying activities each year, I use a Tobit model to analyze 
lobbying spending to deal with the potential censoring problem among cities (Goldstein 
and You 2017; Troustine and Valdini 2008). 
For the second dependent variable, I do not use the percentage of lobbying 
expense in each government's expenditure as a measure of the dependent variable, 
because the independent variables could potentially have effects on both the numerator 
(lobbying expense) and denominator (expenditure). In a model with a percentage as the 
dependent variable, we do not know whether the independent variable has an impact on 
the numerator or the denominator. To isolate the effect of each government's 
expenditure, I choose to control for it on the right side of the equation. The lobbying data 
come from the website of the Center for Responsive Politics.19 
 
 
 
                                                
19 Center for Responsive Politics. “Civil Servants/ Public Officials.” 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=W03 Date accessed: April 2, 2018. 
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Figure II-4 Histogram of City Lobbying Spending in the Sample 
 
 
My key independent variable is the executive institution of each city in the 
sample. I measure the executive institution with a dummy equal to 1 if a city has a 
council-manager form of government; 0 otherwise. As Figure II-5 shows, there are 779 
council-manager cities and 480 mayor-council cities in the sample. On average, council-
manager cities spend 2000 more dollars on lobbying the federal government than mayor-
council cities in a year. The institutional data come from surveys conducted by the 
International City/County Manager's Association (ICMA) in 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 
2001, 2006, and 2011. Following De Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw (2016), I use the 
most recent survey to which a city responded to measure its institutions. When there are 
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missing data in ICMA surveys, I manually collect cities’ most recent institutional 
information from their official government websites.20 
 
 
Figure II-5 Average Yearly Lobbying Spending of Two Types of Cities 
Note: 95% confidence interval. 
                                                
20 Several cities have changed their executive institutions during the observation period (Choi, 
Feiock, and Bae 2013), and this variation may not be reflected in the independent variable 
derived from the ICMA surveys. Systematically identifying the institutional changes of each city 
in the sample during the observation period is extremely difficult and time-consuming. 
Therefore, I have tried to contact the authors of Choi, Feiock, and Bae (2013) regarding their 
dataset on the adoption and abandonment of council-manager governments. However, I have not 
received any response from them by the completion of this dissertation. Given that the post-1965 
changes of executive institutions are mainly driven by population size and unemployment rate, 
which have already been included in my models, and the number of cities that have adopted 
institutional reforms is small during the observation period (Choi, Feiock, and Bae 2013), this 
potential measurement error should have a limited effect on the main findings. 
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Other control variables consist of the demographic, financial and political 
characteristics of sampled cities as these variables may influence the motivations, 
obstacles or resources for intergovernmental lobbying (Goldstein and You 2017). The 
demographic variables include population size, land area, water area, percentage of 
senior (over 65) people in the population, percentage of student (5-17) people in the 
population, ethnic heterogeneity,21 median household income, percentage of unemployed 
population in labor force, percentage of population below the poverty level, and Gini 
index of income inequality. These data come from the Decennial Census and American 
Community Surveys. The financial variables include the difference between city- and 
state-level direct expenditure per capita (i.e., public goods gap), the share of property tax 
in a city’s revenue, and the share of intergovernmental transfer in a city’s revenue. These 
data are collected from the Census of Governments. Finally, the political variables 
include the party affiliation of the House Representative and senators who represent 
cities and the state governors (Shor and McCarty 2011). I also include year fixed effects 
in logit and Tobit models to capture any time-specific trend.22 Table II-1 reports the 
summary statistics. 
 
 
                                                
21 Ethnic heterogeneity is calculated using 1 − 𝑝!!!!!!  (i.e., Gibbs-Martin index or Blau index), 
where 𝑝! represents a share of an ethnicity 𝑖 in a population (Goldstein and You 2017). 
22 For instance, even-numbered years tend to have fewer new lobbyist registrations under LDA 
than odd-numbered years due to the shifts in party control of the White House and Congress or 
shifts in the issue agenda resulting from elections (Straus 2015). The 2007 Honest Leadership 
and Open Government Act (HLOGA) (LaPira and Thomas III 2014; Straus 2017) and the 2011 
earmark ban may also cause declines in lobbying activities (Kirk, Mallett, and Peterman 2017). 
 40 
 
 
Table II-1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Lobbying 
Participation 17626 0.241 0.428 0.000 1.000 
Lobbying 
Spending Logged 17626 2.390 4.577 0.000 13.361 
Council Manager 17626 0.613 0.487 0.000 1.000 
District-Based 
Elections 17626 35.606 41.629 0.000 100.000 
Initiative 17626 0.655 0.475 0.000 1.000 
Referendum 17626 0.675 0.468 0.000 1.000 
Recall 17626 0.596 0.491 0.000 1.000 
Public Goods Gap 
($)  17626 -2.165 1.237 -12.255 6.814 
Population (K) 17626 103.601 298.033 18.156 8214.426 
Land Area (K sq. 
miles) 17626 0.040 0.108 0.001 2.717 
Water Area (K sq. 
miles) 17626 0.004 0.024 0.000 0.552 
Senior (%) 17626 12.396 4.247 2.553 37.776 
Student (%) 17626 17.573 3.558 2.523 31.856 
Ethnic 
Heterogeneity 17626 0.385 0.167 0.037 0.784 
Median Income 
($K) 17626 58.259 21.855 22.303 192.777 
Unemployment 
(%) 17626 8.042 3.817 1.490 30.252 
Households in 
Poverty 17626 10.828 6.901 0.526 38.146 
Gini Index 17626 0.423 0.053 0.267 0.642 
Property Tax 
Share of Revenue 17626 0.238 0.152 0.000 0.915 
Intergovernmental 
Transfer Share of 
Revenue 17626 0.181 0.130 0.000 0.780 
Democrat House 
Representative 17626 0.708 0.455 0.000 1.000 
Democrat Senator 17626 0.603 0.418 0.000 1.000 
Republican 
Governor 17626 0.518 0.500 0.000 1.000 
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Results 
Table II-2 reports the estimates of the determinants of lobbying participation 
across American cities. Given the logit model specifications, the odds ratios for one unit 
increase in each independent variable and t statistics in parentheses are provided. The 
two-tailed p values are shown in separate columns. Table II-2 also reports McFadden R-
squared (McFadden 1974), the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Akaike 1974), and 
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz 1978). Table II-2 presents 
specifications with controls only alongside specifications that include executive 
institutions; the city-level executive institutions markedly improves model fit (Δ AIC -55 
for Model 2), indicating that city lobbying participation vary significantly by city 
institutions. 
The results are consistent with hypothesis 1. Table 2 indicates that after 
controlling for the divergence between the city and state public goods provision, 
demographic characteristics, public finance conditions, and political variables, executive 
institutions still significantly predict the likelihood that a city participates in formally 
lobbying the federal government. All else equal, council-manager cities are around 40% 
more likely than mayor-council cities to participate in formally lobbying the federal 
government. 
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Table II-2 Determinants of Lobbying Participation across Cities 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Odds Ratio 
(t-statistic) p-value 
Odds Ratio 
(t-statistic) 
p-
value 
Council Manager   
 
1.398 (2.50) 0.013 
Public Goods Gap ($) 1.346 (4.19) 0.000 1.320 (3.89) 0.000 
Population (K) 1.001 (0.60) 0.545 1.002 (0.65) 0.518 
Land Area (K sq. miles) 18.03 (0.96) 0.336 18.43 (0.97) 0.333 
Water Area (K sq. miles) 8.505 (0.64) 0.525 9.049 (0.68) 0.494 
Senior (%) 0.957 (-2.66) 0.008 0.957 (-2.73) 0.006 
Student (%) 1.051 (2.46) 0.014 1.047 (2.27) 0.023 
Ethnic Heterogeneity 4.776 (3.39) 0.001 4.080 (2.96) 0.003 
Median Income ($K) 0.991 (-1.83) 0.067 0.991 (-1.81) 0.071 
Unemployment (%) 1.029 (1.47) 0.140 1.031 (1.60) 0.110 
Households in Poverty 0.964 (-2.45) 0.014 0.968 (-2.21) 0.027 
Gini Index 1330.6 (5.14) 0.000 1438.7 (5.23) 0.000 
Property Tax Share of Revenue 0.0792 (-5.57) 0.000 0.0879 (-5.23) 0.000 
Intergovernmental Transfer 
Share of Revenue 0.121 (-4.83) 0.000 0.164 (-3.98) 0.000 
Democrat House Representative 1.502 (2.90) 0.004 1.502 (2.90) 0.004 
Democrat Senator 1.862 (4.36) 0.000 1.837 (4.28) 0.000 
Republican Governor 1.136 (1.70) 0.090 1.144 (1.78) 0.075 
Year Fixed Effects Y  Y  
Constant 0.009 (-6.36) 0.000 0.006 (-6.62) 0.000 
Observations 17626 
 
17626 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.150 
 
0.153 
 AIC 16596.4 
 
16541.5 
 BIC 16829.7 
 
16782.6 
 Note: Two-tailed p-values. Logit models. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 
if a city submits a lobbying report in a year, 0 otherwise. Models also include year 
dummies not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors are used (clustered at the city 
level). 
 
 
Table II-3 reports the models of federal lobbying spending by city governments. 
Given the Tobit model specifications, the coefficients for one unit increase in each 
independent variable and robust standard errors clustered by cities in parentheses are 
provided. The two-tailed p values are shown in separate columns. Table II-3 also reports 
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McFadden R-squared, AIC, and BIC. I run two regressions. Model 3 includes all control 
variables, whereas Model 4 further includes the measure of executive institutions. City 
executive institutions markedly improve model fit (Δ AIC -39 for Model 4). 
My test corroborates that, after controlling for the divergence between the city 
and state public goods provision, demographic characteristics, public finance conditions, 
and political variables, executive institutions still significantly predict lobbying 
spending. Specifically, compared to mayor-council cities, we expect to see about 208% 
increases in lobbying spending in council-manager cities. This is consistent with the 
aforementioned theoretical argument that city managers are more willing to spend 
money on lobbying than the elected mayors due to their higher professional motivations 
and more institutional expertise.  
The estimated coefficients of the control variables indicate that public goods 
gaps, ethnic composition, and financial conditions have substantial effects on 
intergovernmental lobbying activities, which suggest that some cities invest more in paid 
representation than others. This variation of investment in hiring professional lobbyists 
may significantly affect the equity of democratic representation and social resource 
allocation and further shows the normative importance of intergovernmental lobbying 
(Loftis and Kettler 2015). However, more detailed analysis of the control variables are 
beyond the focus of the current research and can be found in Goldstein and You (2017).  
 
 
 
44 
Table II-3 Determinants of (ln) Lobbying Spending across Cities 
Model 3 Model 4 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) p-value 
Coefficient
 (Robust SE) 
p-
value 
Council Manager 2.081 (0.93) 0.026 
Public Goods Gap ($) 2.333 (0.42) 0.000 2.230 (0.42) 0.000 
Population (K) 0.001 (0.00) 0.552 0.002 (0.00) 0.478 
Land Area (K sq. miles) 19.767 (6.05) 0.001 20.008 (6.01) 0.001 
Water Area (K sq. miles) -15.018 (27.93) 0.591 -14.861 (27.30) 0.586 
Senior (%) -0.357 (0.12) 0.002 -0.368 (0.11) 0.001 
Student (%) 0.483 (0.15) 0.001 0.455 (0.15) 0.003 
Ethnic Heterogeneity 13.251 (2.91) 0.000 12.177 (2.91) 0.000 
Median Income ($K) -0.084 (0.03) 0.015 -0.084 (0.03) 0.016 
Unemployment (%) 0.208 (0.14) 0.150 0.223 (0.14) 0.119 
Households in Poverty -0.304 (0.11) 0.007 -0.278 (0.11) 0.013 
Gini Index 58.324 (10.17) 0.000 58.899 (10.12) 0.000 
Property Tax Share of Revenue -19.559 (3.57) 0.000 -18.786 (3.59) 0.000 
Intergovernmental Transfer 
Share of Revenue -14.635 (3.23) 0.000 -12.727 (3.36) 0.000 
Democrat House Representative 2.864 (0.94) 0.002 2.892 (0.94) 0.002 
Democrat Senator 4.239 (1.03) 0.000 4.124 (1.02) 0.000 
Republican Governor 0.883 (0.55) 0.111 0.919 (0.55) 0.096 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Constant -38.995 (5.80) 0.000 -40.509 (5.81) 0.000 
Sigma 13.690 (0.30) 0.000 13.660 (0.30) 0.000 
Observations 17626 17626 
Pseudo R-squared 0.066 0.066 
AIC 40265.247 40226.686 
BIC 40506.338 40475.555 
Note: Two-tailed p-values. Tobit models. The dependent variable is the amount of 
money (logged) a city spends on lobbying in a year. Models also include year dummies 
not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors are used (clustered at the city level). 
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Robustness Considerations 
Although Table II-2 and Table II-3 provide consistent evidence supporting the 
effect of executive institutions, there might be several empirical concerns regarding the 
robustness of the main findings. Two main categories of empirical concerns merit 
discussion: Measurement and model specifications. Regarding measurement, I replace 
the logged measure of lobbying spending with lobbying spending per capita. As Table 
II-4 shows, executive institutions still have a significantly positive impact on lobbying 
spending per capita. Substantively, other things being equal, compared to mayor-council 
cities, council-manager cities tend to spend 0.25 more dollars per capita on formally 
lobbying the federal government. 
I address the model specification concerns in terms of model dependence, pre-
treatment variables, post-treatment variables, and conditional effects. To reduce model 
dependence in parametric causal inference, I use the nonparametric propensity score 
matching (PSM) and inverse-probability weighting (IPW) to check the robustness of the 
main findings (Ho et al. 2007).23 As Table II-5 and II-6 shows, after matching cities with 
demographic, fiscal, and political factors and year fixed effects, the council-manager 
institution still has a statistically significant average treatment effect on city lobbying 
participation and lobbying spending. 
23 Although the balance-sample size frontier in matching methods developed by King, Lucas, 
and Nielsen (2017) is generally superior to propensity score matching, I could not obtain the 
estimation results using the MatchingFrontier package in R using with computer due to the huge 
computational intensity. Given this technical constraint, I decided to use PSM and IPW to check 
the robustness of the main findings. 
46 
Table II-4 Determinants of Lobbying Spending Per Capita ($) across Cities 
Model 5 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) p-value 
Council Manager 0.248 (0.10) 0.011 
Public Goods Gap ($) 0.227 (0.05) 0.000 
Population (K) -0.000 (0.00) 0.458 
Land Area (K sq. miles) 1.673 (0.37) 0.000 
Water Area (K sq. miles) 0.361 (1.66) 0.827 
Senior (%) -0.033 (0.01) 0.009 
Student (%) 0.039 (0.02) 0.017 
Ethnic Heterogeneity 0.979 (0.31) 0.001 
Median Income ($K) -0.007 (0.00) 0.061 
Unemployment (%) 0.030 (0.02) 0.059 
Households in Poverty -0.026 (0.01) 0.031 
Gini Index 5.472 (1.11) 0.000 
Property Tax Share of Revenue -1.762 (0.40) 0.000 
Intergovernmental Transfer 
Share of Revenue -1.371 (0.36) 0.000 
Democrat House Representative 0.245 (0.10) 0.012 
Democrat Senator 0.390 (0.11) 0.001 
Republican Governor 0.108 (0.06) 0.075 
Year Fixed Effects Y 
Constant 1.437 (0.07) 0.000 
Sigma -4.049 (0.65) 0.000 
Observations 17626 
Pseudo R-squared 0.092 
AIC 22583.742 
BIC 22832.610 
Note: Two-tailed p-values. Tobit models. The dependent variable is lobbying spending 
per capita in a year. Models also include year dummies not reported. Cluster-robust 
standard errors are used (clustered at the city level). 
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Table II-5 The Average Treatment Effects of the Council-Manager Executive 
Institution on Lobbying Participation 
 Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
PSM 
Results 0.059 0.008 7.740 0.000 0.044 0.073 
IPW 
Results 0.058 0.006 9.080 0.000 0.0451 0.070 
 
 
 
Table II-6 The Average Treatment Effects of the Council-Manager Executive 
Institution on (ln) Lobbying Spending 
 Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
PSM 
Results 0.613 0.081 7.560 0.000 0.454 0.771 
IPW 
Results 0.603 0.067 9.030 0.000 0.472 0.734 
 
 
 
Several pretreatment variables may exist and potentially confound the main 
findings. For instance, the adoption of executive institutions tends to be associated with 
the reform of legislative institution or direct democracy, which may also affect 
policymakers’ lobbying decisions (Lubell, Feiock and De La Cruz 2009). Therefore, I 
further include these city-level institutions as control variables in Table II-7. Although 
the models in Table II-7 provide consistent evidence supporting the effect of executive 
institutions, most legislative institutions or direct democracy show negligible effects on 
lobbying spending among American cities. Specifically, the coefficients of the 
percentage of district-based elections and the presence of referendum or recall are not 
statistically significant. The presence of initiative, however, has a statistically significant 
impact on lobbying participation and lobbying spending. Substantively, cities with 
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initiatives are 61% more likely than cities without initiatives to participate in formally 
lobbying the federal government. Compared to cities without initiatives, we expect to 
see about 406% increases in lobbying spending in cities with initiatives. These results 
seem to suggest that citizens’ power of bypassing their city legislature to make public 
policy can induce city leaders to invest more money in formally lobbying the federal 
government to pursue extra resources. 
Although the key theoretical arguments of this work are about executive 
institutions of American cities, the specific theoretical mechanisms (e.g., time horizon or 
policy expertise) occur at the individual level. Executive institutions determine which 
type of executives are elected or hired and, therefore, the individual-level characteristics 
may serve as the mediators between institutions and lobbying decisions. Unfortunately, 
to my knowledge, there is not an individual-level database covering thousands of 
executives during the observation period.24 Given this data limit, this work cannot 
systematically verify the effects of the main theoretical mechanisms. Nevertheless, I still 
find some suggestive but compelling evidence to support the main theoretical arguments. 
First, as mentioned before, previous research using data collected from a small sample of 
cities suggests that city managers tend to have longer tenures than city mayors (Ammons 
and Bosse 2005; McNitt 2010). Thus, city managers may indeed have a longer time 
horizon and a lower discount rate than city mayors. Second, as some elected mayors 
work full time, if the aforementioned expertise argument is correct, cities with full-time 
                                                
24 Existing empirical research with individual-level executive information often only has a 
sample size smaller than 200, such as McCable et al (2008) or Zhang and Feiock (2009). 
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mayors as government executives should be more likely to participate in or invest in 
lobbying activities than cities with part-time mayors as government executives and less 
likely to participate in or invest in lobbying activities than cities with professional 
executives. In Table II-8, I include a new dummy indicating full-time mayors in the 
models25 and the point estimates, though not statistically significant, are consistent with 
my arguments.  
Also, cities’ investments in lobbying the state governments may have a 
substitutive relationship with their investments in lobbying the federal government due 
to resources limits and they are not controlled for in my models due to the lack of state-
level lobbying information. However, this omitted variable should not substantively 
change my main findings because state-level lobbying spending is not a pretreatment 
variable and there is not a clear theoretical reason to believe that the pattern of city 
governments spending money on formally lobbying the state governments is different 
from the pattern of city governments spending money on formally lobbying the federal 
government. If executive institutions do have the same effects on cities’ investments in 
lobbying the state and federal governments, the potential bias should be in favor of the 
null hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
25 The reference category is cities with part-time mayors as government executives. 
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Table II-7 Including Other City Institutional Controls 
Model 6 
(Logit; 
DV=Participati
on) 
Model 7 
(Tobit; DV= 
logged 
spending) 
 Odds Ratio 
(t-statistic) p-value 
Coefficient 
 (Robust SE) 
p-
value 
Council Manager 1.321 (2.00) 0.045 1.591 (0.95) 0.093 
District-Based Elections (%) 1.000 (-0.24) 0.809 -0.003 (0.01) 0.755 
Initiative 1.610 (3.63) 0.000 4.059 (0.92) 0.000 
Referendum 0.881 (-1.13) 0.257 -1.059 (0.84) 0.208 
Recall 1.048 (0.37) 0.711 0.489 (0.96) 0.610 
Public Goods Gap ($) 1.326 (3.90) 0.000 2.225 (0.42) 0.000 
Population (K) 1.001 (0.55) 0.581 0.001 (0.00) 0.542 
Land Area (K sq. miles) 20.22 (0.90) 0.366 19.246 (5.91) 0.001 
Water Area (K sq. miles) 6.650 (0.57) 0.569 
-15.301 
(26.95) 0.570 
Senior (%) 0.956 (-2.78) 0.005 -0.363 (0.11) 0.001 
Student (%) 1.050 (2.41) 0.016 0.482 (0.15) 0.001 
Ethnic Heterogeneity 4.559 (3.17) 0.002 13.007 (2.88) 0.000 
Median Income ($K) 0.991 (-1.89) 0.059 -0.090 (0.03) 0.010 
Unemployment (%) 1.034 (1.73) 0.083 0.246 (0.14) 0.085 
Households in Poverty 0.965 (-2.41) 0.016 -0.305 (0.11) 0.006 
Gini Index 2023.0 (5.39) 0.000 60.559 (10.12) 0.000 
Property Tax Share of Revenue 0.0971 (-5.02) 0.000 -17.769 (3.55) 0.000 
Intergovernmental Transfer 
Share of Revenue 0.203 (-3.38) 0.001 -10.721 (3.43) 0.002 
Democrat House Representative 1.491 (2.86) 0.004 2.751 (0.92) 0.003 
Democrat Senator 1.748 (3.89) 0.000 3.645 (1.02) 0.000 
Republican Governor 1.129 (1.59) 0.112 0.791 (0.54) 0.145 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Constant 0.004 (-6.92) 0.000 -43.449 (5.85) 0.000 
Sigma 13.551 (0.30) 0.000 
Observations 17626 17626 
Pseudo R-squared 0.159 0.07 
AIC 16438.2 40083.650 
BIC 16710.4 
 
40363.627 
 Note: Two-tailed p-values. Models also include year dummies not reported. Cluster-
robust standard errors are used (clustered at the city level). 
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Table II-8 The Effect of Full-Time Mayors on City Lobbying Spending 
Model 8 
(Logit; 
DV=Participati
on) 
Model 9 
(Tobit; DV= 
logged 
spending) 
 Odds Ratio 
(t-statistic) p-value 
Coefficient 
 (Robust SE) 
p-
value 
Council Manager 1.686 (2.94) 0.003 3.644 (1.34) 0.007 
Full-Time Mayor 1.349 (1.41) 0.158 2.459 (1.53) 0.108 
Public Goods Gap ($) 1.322 (3.90) 0.000 2.233 (0.42) 0.000 
Population (K) 1.001 (0.64) 0.524 0.002 (0.00) 0.518 
Land Area (K sq. miles) 16.71 (0.96) 0.336 19.575 (5.90) 0.001 
Water Area (K sq. miles) 10.54 (0.73) 0.463 
-13.191 
(26.78) 0.622 
Senior (%) 0.955 (-2.79) 0.005 -0.377 (0.11) 0.001 
Student (%) 1.048 (2.33) 0.020 0.463 (0.15) 0.002 
Ethnic Heterogeneity 4.103 (2.97) 0.003 12.117 (2.91) 0.000 
Median Income ($K) 0.992 (-1.79) 0.073 -0.081 (0.03) 0.020 
Unemployment (%) 1.033 (1.67) 0.095 0.235 (0.14) 0.101 
Households in Poverty 0.965 (-2.37) 0.018 -0.296 (0.11) 0.009 
Gini Index 1554.9 (5.26) 0.000 59.047 (10.12) 0.000 
Property Tax Share of Revenue 0.0862 (-5.24) 0.000 -18.958 (3.61) 0.000 
Intergovernmental Transfer 
Share of Revenue 0.162 (-3.99) 0.000 -12.834 (3.36) 0.000 
Democrat House Representative 1.510 (2.95) 0.003 2.951 (0.94) 0.002 
Democrat Senator 1.832 (4.27) 0.000 4.114 (1.02) 0.000 
Republican Governor 1.139 (1.72) 0.085 0.887 (0.55) 0.108 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Constant 0.005 (-6.85) 0.000 -42.151 (5.86) 0.000 
Sigma 13.645 (0.30) 0.000 
Observations 17626 17626 
Pseudo R-squared 0.154 0.067 
AIC 16527.5 40207.797 
BIC 16776.3 
 
40464.443 
 Note: Two-tailed p-values. Models also include year dummies not reported. Cluster-
robust standard errors are used (clustered at the city level). 
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Moreover, besides my theoretical analysis on time horizon or policy expertise, 
one alternative explanation is that mayors may be better connected with federal officials 
than professional managers. Therefore, given their advantage in informal lobbying, the 
elected mayors may engage less with formal lobbying. However, there is no systematic 
evidence in the existing literature to support this argument. In fact, if we agree that the 
direct purpose of lobbying is to provide a legislative subsidy (Hall and Deardorff 2006; 
Straus 2015), informal lobbying should complement formal lobbying because more 
politically active local politicians are more likely to need professional lobbyists to 
monitor policy developments in Washington, to meet with federal officials and their 
aides, to help formulate politically workable policy proposals, and to testify at 
congressional committee hearings (Nownes 1999; 2006).26 Even if federal officials 
informally support local politicians’ policy positions, the latter still need the help of 
lobbyists who are familiar with federal rules, schedules, and policies to carry out the 
specific advocacy activities. Meanwhile, federal officials might also need local 
executives to pay the cost of hiring professionals for parsing policy information and 
providing policy options. This situation should make the empirical models in this chapter 
less likely to identify a statistically significant and positive impact. Therefore, based on 
this analysis, any bias is likely to work in favor of the null hypothesis.  
26 In fact, according to Association of Government Relations Professionals, “What many people 
regard as lobbying — the actual communication with government officials — represents the 
smallest portion of a lobbyist’s time; a far greater proportion is devoted to the other aspects of 
preparation, information and communication.” Source: http://grprofessionals.org/about-
lobbying/what-is-lobbying Date accessed: July 17, 2018. 
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Further, much anecdotal evidence suggests that cities lobby through institutional 
networks, such as the US conference of mayors or ICMA (Jensen 2018). However, it is 
extremely difficult to collect systematic information on cities’ lobbying investments 
through institutional networks and, therefore, we do not know which type of government 
executives are more likely to invest in lobbying the federal government through 
institutional networks.27 Nevertheless, the phenomenon of lobbying through networks is 
not likely to challenge my main argument and findings. The careers of professional 
executives are determined by their reputation in the national labor market, while the 
political careers of political executives are mainly determined by local elections. 
Therefore, professional executives should have a stronger incentive to maintain a 
professional commitment to institutional collective action. Under this circumstance, we 
should have more confidence in the statistically significant findings in the main models.  
Finally, are the effects of executive institutions conditional on the public 
demands of local communities? To check this possibility, I test the interaction effects 
between the council-manager form of government and public goods gap measured by the 
difference between city and state government direct expenditure per capita ($) 
(Goldstein and You 2017). As shown in Figure II-6 and Figure II-7, there is not enough 
evidence to support the potential interaction effects between city executive institutions 
and the level of local public demands. 
                                                
27 Network participation cannot be used as a proxy for lobbying investments through networks 
because there is not much variation regarding network participation. For instance, US 
Conference of Mayors has more than 1,400 city members. International City/County 
Management Association has more than 3 thousand city members. These city members have 
almost covered all cities in the research sample. 
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Figure II-6 Average Marginal Effects of Executive Institutions on Lobbying 
Participation as Public Goods Gap Changes 
 
 
Figure II-7 Average Marginal Effects of Executive Institutions on Lobbying 
Spending as Public Goods Gap Changes 
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Conclusion 
This research addressed an important gap in the lobbying literature: the lack of 
supply-side institutional analysis of policymakers’ motivations and expertise in the 
process of intergovernmental lobbying. I used a dataset that covers more than 1200 cities 
between 1999 and 2012 and a series of models to empirically test the impact of 
executive institutions on lobbying participation and lobbying spending among the 
American cities. My estimates exhibited evidence of executive institutional structures as 
a determinant of intergovernmental lobbying as indicated by the high correlation 
between professional executives institutions (relative to political executive institutions) 
and lobbying participation or lobbying spending. This study has aimed to better 
understand intergovernmental lobbying through an actor-level perspective in particular, 
but also to contribute an institutional dimension to the study of intergovernmental 
lobbying. 
This work is consistent with a recent trend in Public Administration, Public 
Policy, and Political Science that seeks to identify the political or policy consequences of 
American city institutions (Clingermayer and Feiock 2014; Feiock, Jeong, and Kim 
2003; Krebs and Pelissero 2010; Lubell, Feiock and De La Cruz 2009; Trounstine 2010; 
Trounstine and Valdini 2008). Using the policy case of intergovernmental lobbying, my 
analysis corroborates that what differs one government executive from another 
government executive is the incentive structure and expertise that support their decisions 
regarding each policy issue.  
 56 
 
Moreover, numerous research published in social science has widely discussed 
the effects of intergovernmental relations on local governance (Bardhan 2002; Oates 
1999; Treisman 2007). However, much less attention is paid to the potential effects of 
local governance on intergovernmental relations. The theoretical and empirical analysis 
in this chapter implies that local institutions may affect intergovernmental relations by 
shaping the process of intergovernmental lobbying. Therefore, future research on the 
origins of intergovernmental relations should pay more attention to the potential effects 
of local factors. 
The logic of intergovernmental lobbying illustrated in this work has important 
implications for social equity, too. In the literature on private lobbying, an important 
concern of the private interest groups is that citizens with more money and better 
political connections can exert more influence than others (Schattschneider and 
Adamany 1975). Similarly, as subnational governments tend to have the incentives to 
influence the process of intergovernmental resource allocation through lobbying, the 
analysis reported in this chapter suggests that the current system might favor council-
manager governments and significantly shape the provision of public goods in a society. 
Therefore, researchers may take the intergovernmental lobbying determined by local 
executive institutions into consideration when studying political, economic, and social 
equity across jurisdictions. Practitioners should also pay more attention to the 
institutional variation in the public sector when reforming lobbying regulations in the 
future. 
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For future research on intergovernmental lobbying, my study suggests that local 
institutions and actor-level motivation and resources on the supply side of public goods 
deserve more attention. As my theoretical analysis mainly focuses on the local 
governments that lobby instead of the governments that are lobbied. I expect that the key 
hypotheses generated in this research may also apply to the cases of cities lobbying 
states or cities lobbying cities. Therefore, future research with more fine-grained data 
can further test the applicability of these hypotheses in other types of vertical or 
horizontal lobbying activities. Besides executive institutions, future research may also 
theorize and empirically test the effects of other types of local institutions on the 
lobbying activities of local governments. 
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CHAPTER III  
LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM AND STATE FORMAL LOBBYING 
ACTIVITIES 
Introduction 
The vast research literature on lobbying seeks to explain the origins, strategies, 
content, and consequence of lobbying activities among private interest groups (De 
Figueiredo and Richter 2014). However, much less attention is paid to the process of 
intergovernmental lobbying. Most of the existing studies on intergovernmental lobbying 
are qualitative and may facilitate our understanding of its history or operation 
(Baumgartner et al. 2009; Browne and Salisbury 1972; Cigler 1995; Cingranelli 1983; 
Flanagan 1999; Freeman and Nownes 1999; Jensen 2018; Nownes 2006), but they 
cannot systematically identify the determinants of government lobbying decisions. Due 
to the increasing availability of professional lobbying data, several scholars have 
attempted to fill this gap by analyzing the effects of local public demands on city 
lobbying participation or spending (Goldstein and You 2017; Loftis and Kettler 2015).  
State governments have spent millions of dollars on lobbying the federal 
government each year. They often have the same lobbying targets, such as the U.S. 
Senate, U.S. House of Representative, and various government departments 
(Baumgartner et al. 2009). Further, like private organizations, states lobby the federal 
government mainly for additional resources or policy supports. Nevertheless, we still 
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know little about the determinants of state lobbying activities. What determines state 
governments’ participation and investment in lobbying the federal government?  
In this chapter, I develop a simple theory on the supply side of public service to 
explain how legislative professionalism leads to more lobbying participation and 
investment among state governments. First, in terms of motivation, more professional 
state legislatures have more political channels to collect information from voters and are 
more likely to represent the preferences of the median voters (i.e., more public goods) to 
get reelected. Thus, state policymakers in a highly professional state legislature are more 
likely to allocate resources for lobbying the federal government to pursue resources to 
meet the demands of the median voters. Second, in terms of resource, more professional 
state legislatures have more time, staff, and discretionary resources for overcoming the 
transaction cost during lobbying process, which may effectively facilitate the hiring of, 
negotiating with, coordination with and monitoring of professional lobbyists in 
Washington. Therefore, legislative professionalism should be positively associated with 
state lobbying activities. 
Using a panel dataset covering 50 states from 1999 to 2011, I find that after 
controlling for political, financial, and demographic characteristics, multiple measures of 
legislative professionalism drawn from previous state politics literature (Squire 1992, 
2007, 2012; Bowen and Greene 2014) have consistently positive effects on state 
lobbying participation and lobbying investment. Therefore, the hypothesized effects of 
legislative professionalism receive strong empirical support. 
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This study makes at least two contributions to the existing literature. First, my 
analysis advances the existing intergovernmental lobbying literature by highlighting the 
role of legislative professionalism in the lobbying process. I point out that states with 
different levels of legislative capacity have different motivations and resources regarding 
lobbying the federal government. Second, this study also contributes to the literature on 
state politics by showing that the institutional logic identified in the existing literature 
also applies to state governments’ lobbying activities. Therefore, the effects of state 
institutions deserve more attention in future intergovernmental lobbying research. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I provide a brief overview 
of the literature on intergovernmental lobbying and legislative professionalism and 
present the main theoretical arguments and hypotheses. Second, I report the data, 
models, and findings. Finally, I highlight the main results and their importance. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 Lobbying has drawn increasing attention from scholars in economics, political 
science, and public administration in recent decades. Specifically, economists have 
evaluated the importance of connection or expertise in determining the monetary 
premium of lobbyists (Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi 2014; Vidal, Draca, and Fons-
Rosen 2012), and the returns from investments in lobbying in different policy sectors 
(Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta 2016; De Figueiredo 2006; Kang 2016). Political 
scientists have modeled lobbying as exchange, persuasion, or legislative subsidy (Hall 
and Deardorff 2006; Salisbury 1969; Schnakenberg 2017) and evaluated how lobbying 
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affects legislative voting (Giger and Klüver 2016; Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Wright 
1990). Public administration scholars have found that interest groups have been actively 
sharing policy and political information with the executive branch to shape the rule-
making process (Binderkrantz, Christiansen, and Pedersen 2015; Furlong and Kerwin 
2005; Gill and Witko 2013; Nelson and Yackee 2012; Yackee 2006; Yackee and Yackee 
2006). 
Nevertheless, most of the previous research focuses on how citizens or business 
groups lobby government officials. We still know little about how and why governments 
lobby governments. Given the fact that American subnational governments spend 
millions of dollars on hiring professional lobbyists to lobby the federal government each 
year, which may potentially determine who have more voice in American politics or 
who receive more resources from the federal government, intergovernmental lobbying 
deserves more academic attention.  
In recent years, several scholars have noticed this gap and attempted to 
systematically identify the determinants of city governments’ lobbying participation or 
spending using the recently available empirical data. For instance, Loftis and Kettler 
(2015) find that economic distress pushes cities to lobby the federal government and 
Goldstein and You (2017) find that the underprovision of public goods is associated with 
cities’ participation in lobbying the federal government. However, little is known about 
the determinants of state lobbying activities. Why do some state governments more 
frequently lobby the federal government than others? Why do some state governments 
spend more money on lobbying the federal government than others? 
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To answer these questions, this work establishes a theoretical relationship 
between legislative professionalism and state lobbying activities. Legislative 
professionalism refers to the overall level of legislative capacity by a state government, 
and it tends to be measured with a specific set of institutional developments regarding 
staff or expenditures for the legislature, legislative compensation, and time in sessions 
(Bowen and Greene 2014). Previous studies have highlighted the influential role of 
legislative professionalism in shaping state governments’ decisions in terms of policy 
adoption or resource allocation (Maestas 2000; Owings and Borck 2000; Shipan and 
Volden 2006). In fact, scholars not only view legislature professionalism as a measure of 
legislative capacity (Fortunato and Turner 2018) but also a measure of political expertise 
(Shipan and Volden 2014).  
Based on the existing literature, we can thus reasonably expect that a state 
government with a high level of legislative professionalism would take advantage of its 
resources and expertise when making decisions regarding lobbying the federal 
government.  Particularly, I argue that legislative professionalism has a positive impact 
on state lobbying participation or spending through two mechanisms. 
First, legislative professionalism increases the motivations of state policymakers 
to allocate resources for lobbying the federal government. Multiple studies have shown 
that more professionalized legislatures can more effectively collect information from 
voters and are more responsive to citizen preferences (Berry, Berkman and 
Schneiderman 2000; Fortunato and Turner 2018; Maestas 2000; Shipan and Volden 
2014). Therefore, more professionalized legislatures can more efficiently translate public 
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opinions into policy outcomes. Given that median voters tend to have relatively lower 
social economic status and stronger public goods demands than political elites (Meltzer 
and Richard 1981, 1983), legislative professionalism could increase state governments’ 
motivations to lobby the federal government for additional resources to meet the 
demands of median voters. 
Second, legislative professionalism provides the necessary resources for 
facilitating state lobbying activities. Lobbying process generally involves a high level of 
transaction cost, including hiring appropriate lobbyists in terms of their connection or 
expertise, coordinating with the lobbyists to prepare policy proposal for federal officials, 
and monitoring lobbyists’ behaviors to make sure they deliver the promised service, etc. 
A highly professionalized state legislature will have more staff, time, and resources for 
overcoming these transaction costs, such as facilitating the hiring of, coordination with 
and monitoring of professional lobbyists in Washington. With better access to 
professional lobbyists in Washington, it is easier for state governments to form a policy 
stream and share their policy ideas or proposals with federal officials (Kingdon 1984). 
Therefore, state governments with a higher level of legislative professionalism may not 
only have more access to lobbying service but also higher lobbying performance. 
In general, I expect that states with a higher level of legislative professionalism 
are more likely to participate in and invest in lobbying the federal government. 
Hypothesis 1: State legislative professionalism increases a state’s likelihood 
of lobbying participation. 
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Hypothesis 2: State legislative professionalism increases a state’s investment 
in lobbying activities. 
 
Data and Methods 
I test the hypotheses with a panel dataset covering 50 states from 1999 to 2011. 
The unit of analysis is state-year. I collect the state lobbying data by scraping the 
information falling under the category of Civil Servants/Public Officials on the website 
of the Center for Responsive Politics.28 Figure III-1 reports each state’s annual lobbying 
spending during the observation period. There are two dependent variables of interest. I 
set the first dependent variable as a dummy equal to 1 if a state government submits a 
federal lobbying report in a year, and 0 if otherwise. I employ logit models to predict the 
binary dependent variable. The second dependent variable of interest captures the 
amount of money a state government invests in lobbying the federal government. It is 
measured with the natural log of the level of lobbying expense. Given the non-negative 
nature of the dependent variable and LDA only requires the registration of any 
organization that contributes more than $ 10,000 towards lobbying activities each year, I 
use a Tobit model to analyze lobbying spending to deal with the potential censoring 
problem among states.  
 
                                                
28 Center for Responsive Politics. “Civil Servants/ Public Officials.” 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=W03 Date accessed: April 2, 2018. 
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Figure III-1 State Government Lobbying Spending (1999-2011) 
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My key independent variable is legislative professionalism. Following previous 
literature (Fortunato and Turner 2018; Squire 2017), I first employ the commonly used 
Squire Index to test the key hypotheses. The Squire Index is developed to measure the 
degree to which a state legislature resembles the U.S. Congress along three dimensions 
(i.e., legislators’ salaries, days in session, and staff per member) and is theoretically 
bounded between 0 and 1. Figure III-2 shows the state Squire Index during the 
observation period. 
Moreover, professionalism may have multidimensional implications and some 
states choose to professionalize in some components more than others. Therefore, I also 
use the two-dimensional indices developed by Bowen and Greene (2014) based on the 
approach of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) to measure professionalism. The first 
dimension (MDS 1) represents the broad differences between amateur and professional 
legislatures. The second dimension (MDS 2), by contrast, represents the differences 
between a support-intensive (high staff support and short sessions) versus work-
intensive (low staff support and long sessions) legislatures. Compared to the one-
dimensional Squire Index, Bowen and Greene’s two-dimensional measures can more 
comprehensively capture the commonality and variation of legislative professionalism 
across the states.  
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Figure III-2 State Squire Index (1999-2011) 
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As the Squire Index is measure about once a decade and Bowen and Greene’s 
indices (2014) are measured biennially, I impute the missing values with the observable 
values in the previous year (Fortunato and Turner 2018).29 If Squire Index, MDS 1, and 
MDS 2 have a consistently positive impact on state lobbying participation and lobbying 
expense, then there is strong evidence that legislature professionalism increases state 
lobbying activities. 
State policymakers’ lobbying decisions are also likely to be influenced by other 
factors. Building on previous research on state politics (Berry and Berry 1990; Shipan 
and Volden 2006), I mainly include political, financial, and demographic controls in the 
models. As one of the most important goals of state politicians is to be reelected, 
researchers argue that the proximity of state elections is correlated with the probability 
of adopting a policy (Besley and Coate 2003; Nicholson-Crotty 2015). Therefore, I 
include a dummy variable indicating a Gubernatorial election year in the models. The 
Gubernatorial election information is collected from the Governors Dataset created by 
Carl Klarner.30 
 
 
 
 
                                                
29 The Squire Index is collected from the replication dataset of Fortunato and Turner (2018; 
before 2010) and Squire (2017; after 2010). 
30 Klarner, Carl, 2013, "Governors Dataset." Source: https://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/20408, 
Harvard Dataverse. Date accessed: October 5, 2018. 
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Table III-1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
State lobbying 
participation 650 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00 
State lobbying 
spending logged 650 8.01 5.68 0.00 14.56 
Squire Index 650 0.19 0.11 0.03 0.63 
MDS 1 650 0.15 1.65 -1.85 8.58 
MDS 2 650 0.13 0.75 -3.07 3.17 
Gubernatorial 
election year 650 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Democrat governor 650 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Government liberal 
ideology 650 47.53 14.27 17.51 73.62 
Citizen liberal 
ideology 650 51.71 15.80 8.45 95.97 
Total expenditure 
($1000) 650 30140.35 37195.94 2271.67 285238.10 
Fiscal health  650 0.04 0.18 -0.76 1.25 
Federal transfer (%) 650 26.72 8.09 12.32 101.18 
Debt burden (%) 650 55.41 30.98 13.83 245.51 
Per Capita Personal 
Income ($1000) 650 34.84 7.04 20.73 63.77 
Unemployment (%) 650 5.61 2.09 2.30 13.70 
Population (1000) 650 5901.77 6484.42 491.78 37672.65 
Political scientists have proposed partisan and ideological explanations for state 
government spending, too (Nicholson-Crotty 2015). The partisan theory suggests that 
the governing party tends to spend money on policies that satisfy core constituencies. As 
the core supporters and members of the Democratic Party are assumed to prefer the 
expansion of public service, I expect that state lobbying spending increases with state 
elite liberalism. Specifically, I set a dummy equal to 1 if a governor is a Democrat, and 0 
otherwise. I also include a measure of government liberal ideology drawn from Berry et 
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al. (2010) in the models.31 By contrast, the electoral theory suggests that politicians are 
likely to manipulate government spending to buy the median votes. Accordingly, I also 
include a measure of citizen liberal ideology drawn from Berry et al. (2010) in the 
models. 
The financial characteristics of state government may affect their lobbying 
spending, too. For instance, the size of government expenditure, fiscal health,32 the 
percentage of federal transfer, and the percentage of debt burden may have a directly 
stimulating or dampening effect on state government’s lobbying spending. The 
information on these variables is collected from The Government Finance Database 
(Pierson, Hand, and Thompson 2015).33 
Similarly, the demographic characteristics can potentially affect the resources or 
motivations of state governments, thus shaping their lobbying spending. I include the per 
capita personal income, percentage of unemployment, and population size in the models, 
as these variables are most likely to be correlated with the demands of public goods in 
each state. The data are collected from the websites of the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis34 and the Bureau of Labor Statistics35. I also include year fixed effects in logit 
                                                
31 Richard C. Fording. 2018. “State Ideology Data.” Source: 
https://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/ Date accessed: October 5, 2018. 
32 This measure is calculated using the following formula: (!"#$% !"#"$%"!!"#$% !"#!$%&'()!)!"#$% !"#!$%&'()!  (Berry and Berry 1990). 
33 Kawika Pierson, Michael L. Hand, and Thompson. “The Government Finance Database.” 
Source: http://willamette.edu/mba/research-impact/public-datasets/index.html Date accessed: 
September 4, 2018. 
34 Bureau of Economic Analysis. “Regional Economic Accounts: Downolad.” Source: 
https://apps.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm Date accessed: September 5, 2018 
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and Tobit models to capture any time-specific trend (Goldstein and You 2007). I do not 
include state fixed effects in the models given the fact that the measures of legislature 
professionalism are stable during the observed period.  Also, the stable political controls 
should be able to help isolate the effects of legislative professionalism, too. The 
summary statistics of all variables are reported in Table 1. 
 
Findings 
Table III-2 reports the estimates of the determinants of lobbying participation 
across American states. Given the logit model specifications, the odds ratio for one unit 
increase in each independent variable and t statistics in parentheses are provided. The 
two-tailed p values are shown in separate columns. Table III-2 also reports McFadden R-
squared (McFadden 1974), the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Akaike 1974), and 
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz 1978). Table III-2 presents 
specifications with controls only alongside specifications that include Squire Index or 
MDS Indices; the measures of state legislative professionalism markedly improves 
model fit, indicating that state lobbying participation varies significantly by the level of 
legislative professionalism. 
The results in Table III-2 provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. After 
controlling for political, financial, and demographic characteristics, Squire Index and 
MDS indices still significantly predict the likelihood that a city participates in lobbying 
                                                                                                                                           
35 Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Civilian Noninstitutional Population and Associated Rate and 
Ratio Measures for Model-Based Areas.” Source: https://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm Date 
accessed: September 5, 2018. 
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the federal government. To facilitate the interpretation and comparison of coefficients, I 
report the percent change of odds ratio for one standard deviation increase in each 
variable in Table III-3. All else equal, when the measures of legislative professionalism 
of a state increase by one standard deviation, the state is at least 210% more likely to 
participate in lobbying the federal government. The odds ratio of one unit increase in the 
Squire Index in Table III-2 seems extremely large. However, as Table III-3 shows, the 
percent change of odds ratio for one standard deviation increase in the Squire Index is 
only 220.4%. As a robustness check, I ran a Firth logit model and produced similar 
results (not reported here). Nevertheless, Table III-2 does not provide strong evidence to 
confirm the effects of the control variables. 
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Table III-2 Determinants of State Lobbying Participation 
 Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   
 Odds 
Ratio 
(t-statistic) 
p-
value 
Odds 
Ratio 
(t-statistic) 
p-
value 
Odds 
Ratio 
(t-statistic) 
p-
value 
Squire Index   25445.5  (2.28) 0.022    
MDS 1      
5.291  
(3.67) 0.000 
MDS 2      
4.505  
(4.09) 0.000 
Gubernatorial 
election year 
0.949  
(-0.21) 0.832 
1.028  
(0.12) 0.906 
1.076  
(0.29) 0.771 
Democrat governor 1.729  (0.95) 0.342 
1.988  
(1.25) 0.212 
2.407  
(1.46) 0.143 
Government liberal 
ideology 
0.983  
(-0.73) 0.466 
0.977  
(-0.99) 0.321 
0.972  
(-1.24) 0.214 
Citizen liberal 
ideology 
0.985  
(-0.89) 0.372 
0.978  
(-1.16) 0.245 
0.978  
(-1.13) 0.258 
Total expenditure 
($1000) 
1.000  
(1.99) 0.047 
1.000  
(0.72) 0.473 
1.000  
(0.32) 0.751 
Fiscal health  0.0727  (-1.71) 0.087 
0.0865  
(-1.47) 0.142 
0.133  
(-1.29) 0.197 
Federal transfer 
(%) 
0.948  
(-1.38) 0.169 
0.965  
(-1.10) 0.269 
0.990  
(-0.28) 0.777 
Debt burden (%) 0.987  (-1.20) 0.230 
0.985  
(-1.33) 0.184 
0.991  
(-0.99) 0.321 
Per Capita Personal 
Income ($1000) 
1.033  
(0.74) 0.458 
1.021 
(0.44) 0.662 
0.983  
(-0.32) 0.751 
Unemployment 
(%) 
1.204  
(0.99) 0.321 
1.177  
(0.79) 0.429 
1.052  
(0.23) 0.819 
Population (1000) 1.000  (-1.29) 0.198 
1.000  
(-0.96) 0.335 
1.000  
(-1.63) 0.103 
Year fixed effects Y  Y  Y  
Constant 
9.124  
(1.11) 0.265 
4.998  
(0.79) 0.432 
142.1  
(2.03) 0.042 
Observations 650  650  650  
Pseudo R2  0.131  0.174  0.234  
AIC 763.5  730.4  683.0  
BIC 870.9  842.3  799.4  
Note: Two-tailed p-values. Logit models. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 
if a state submits a lobbying report in a year, 0 otherwise. Models also include year 
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dummies not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors are used (clustered at the state 
level). 
 
 
Table III-3 The Percent Change of Odds Ratio for One Standard Deviation 
Increase in Each Variable (Logit Models) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Squire Index  220.4    
MDS 1    1456.2 
MDS 2    210.8 
Gubernatorial election year -2.3 1.2 3.2 
Democrat governor 31.2 40.5 54.5 
Government liberal ideology -21.6 -28.2 -33.8 
Citizen liberal ideology -21.2 -29.5 -30 
Total expenditure ($1000) 666.8 82.3 40 
Fiscal health  -37.5 -35.5 -30.4 
Federal transfer (%) -35.2 -25.3 -7.6 
Debt burden (%) -32.9 -37.4 -25.2 
Per Capita Personal Income 
($1000) 25.9 15.4 -11.4 
Unemployment (%) 47.3 40.4 11.2 
Population (1000) -64.7 -46 -67.4 
 
Table III-4 reports the estimates of the determinants of state lobbying spending. 
Given the Tobit model specifications, the coefficients for one unit increase in each 
independent variable and robust standard errors clustered by each state in parentheses 
are provided. The two-tailed p values are shown in separate columns. Table III-4 also 
reports McFadden R-squared, AIC, and BIC. I run three regressions. Model 4 includes 
all control variables, whereas Model 5 and Model 6 includes the Squire Index and MDS 
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indices, separately. The measures of goodness of fit in Table 3 suggests that legislative 
professionalism markedly improve model fit. 
The results in Table III-4 corroborate that, after controlling for political, 
financial, and demographic factors, legislative professionalism still significantly predicts 
state lobbying spending. To facilitate the interpretation and comparison of coefficients, I 
report the percent change of state lobbying spending for one standard deviation increase 
in each independent variable in Table III-5. Substantively, the coefficients of the Squire 
Index and MDS indices indicate that one standard deviation increase in legislative 
professionalism leads to at least a 128.9% increase in state lobbying spending. This is 
consistent with the aforementioned theoretical analysis that legislative professionalism 
increases the motivation and resources underlying state lobbying spending. Also, there is 
consistent evidence that state fiscal health has a negative impact on lobbying spending. 
In other words, when a state’s treasury is fiscally healthy, state policymakers may have 
fewer motivations to invest resources in lobbying the federal government. Again, most 
control variables show statistically insignificant impacts on the outcome variable. 
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Table III-4 Determinants of (ln) State Lobbying Spending 
 Model 4   Model 5   Model 6   
 Coefficient 
(Robust 
SE) 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
(Robust 
SE) 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
(Robust 
SE) 
p-
value 
Squire Index   26.185 (9.88) 0.008    
MDS 1      
2.654 
(0.82) 0.001 
MDS 2      
1.711 
(0.78) 0.029 
Gubernatorial 
election year 
-0.249 
(0.85) 0.770 
-0.062 
(0.80) 0.938 
-0.080 
(0.80) 0.921 
Democrat 
governor 
2.251 
(2.18) 0.303 
1.979 
(2.12) 0.352 
2.522 
(2.10) 0.230 
Government 
liberal ideology 
-0.068 
(0.08) 0.412 
-0.062 
(0.08) 0.452 
-0.084 
(0.08) 0.305 
Citizen liberal 
ideology 
-0.064 
(0.07) 0.349 
-0.090 
(0.07) 0.178 
-0.076 
(0.07) 0.256 
Total expenditure 
($1000) 
0.000 
(0.00) 0.340 
-0.000 
(0.00) 0.706 
-0.000 
(0.00) 0.272 
Fiscal health  -11.936 (5.62) 0.034 
-10.994 
(5.31) 0.039 
-10.403 
(5.11) 0.042 
Federal transfer 
(%) 
-0.202 
(0.13) 0.122 
-0.152 
(0.13) 0.227 
-0.115 
(0.12) 0.337 
Debt burden (%) -0.048 (0.04) 0.250 
-0.056 
(0.04) 0.166 
-0.045 
(0.04) 0.222 
Per Capita 
Personal Income 
($1000) 
0.196 
(0.17) 0.259 
0.156 
(0.17) 0.362 
0.122 
(0.17) 0.479 
Unemployment 
(%) 
0.884 
(0.63) 0.162 
0.704 
(0.63) 0.263 
0.615 
(0.60) 0.310 
Population (1000) -0.000 (0.00) 0.978 
0.000 
(0.00) 0.994 
-0.000 
(0.00) 0.726 
Year fixed effects Y  Y  Y  
Constant 
9.591 
(7.55) 0.204 
7.996 
(7.65) 0.296 
13.697 
(7.17) 0.057 
Sigma 
7.332 
(0.68) 0.000 
7.134 
(0.67) 0.000 
7.030 
(0.66) 0.000 
Observations 650  650  650  
Pseudo R2  0.034  0.043  0.047  
AIC 3426.567  3395.430  3384.340  
BIC 3538.491  3511.831  3505.218  
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Note: Two-tailed p-values. Tobit models. The dependent variable the amount of money 
(logged) a state spends on lobbying in a year. Models also include year dummies not 
reported. Cluster-robust standard errors are used (clustered at the state level). 
 
 
Table III-5 The Percent Change of Lobbying Spending for One Standard Deviation 
Increase in Each Variable (Tobit Models) 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Squire Index  300.6   
MDS 1    437.3 
MDS 2   128.9 
Gubernatorial election year -10.8 -2.7 -3.4 
Democrat governor 111.5 98 124.9 
Government liberal ideology -97.3 -89 -119.4 
Citizen liberal ideology -101.3 -141.8 -119.4 
Total expenditure ($1000) 165.8 -55.5 -193.4 
Fiscal health  -213.8 -196.9 -186.4 
Federal transfer (%) -163.4 -123.1 -93.2 
Debt burden (%) -147.5 -172.4 -139.3 
Per Capita Personal Income 
($1000) 137.7 109.9 86.1 
Unemployment (%) 184.3 146.8 128.2 
Population (1000) -5 1.2 -45.8 
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Robustness Considerations 
One empirical concern of the main findings is that the outliers may significantly 
bias the estimated results. For instance, as shown in Figure III-1, California and 
Pennsylvania lobbied the federal government each year and these two states spent the 
biggest amount of money on lobbying the federal government during the observation 
period. Figure III-2 also shows that these two states have a high level of legislative 
professionalism. Therefore, I account for the effects of these outliers by including them 
as two dummies variables (CA and PA) in the statistical models. Table III-6 reports the 
logit models of lobbying participation. As CA and PA predict lobbying participation 
perfectly, 26 observations are automatically dropped from the logit models. Table III-7 
reports the Tobit models with CA and PA as additional controls. Table III-6 and III-7 
show that legislative professionalism has a statistically significant and positive impact on 
lobbying participation and lobbying spending after accounting for the outliers. The point 
estimates are similar to those reported in Table III-2 and III-4. 
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Table III-6 Determinants of State Lobbying Participation (Excluding CA and PA) 
 Model 7   Model 8   
 Odds Ratio 
(t-statistic) p-value 
Odds Ratio 
(t-statistic) p-value 
Squire Index 19404.7 (2.22) 0.026    
MDS 1    5.276 (3.65) 0.000 
MDS 2    4.490 (4.06) 0.000 
Gubernatorial election 
year 1.026 (0.11) 0.911 1.075 (0.29) 0.772 
Democrat governor 1.946 (1.21) 0.226 2.404 (1.46) 0.144 
Government liberal 
ideology 0.978 (-0.95) 0.343 0.972 (-1.24) 0.215 
Citizen liberal ideology 0.978 (-1.20) 0.231 0.978 (-1.13) 0.257 
Total expenditure ($1000) 1.000 (0.62) 0.535 1.000 (0.32) 0.751 
Fiscal health  0.0884 (-1.47) 0.141 0.133 (-1.29) 0.197 
Federal transfer (%) 0.964 (-1.12) 0.262 0.990 (-0.29) 0.775 
Debt burden (%) 0.985 (-1.31) 0.189 0.991 (-0.99) 0.321 
Per Capita Personal 
Income ($1000) 1.022 (0.46) 0.646 0.983 (-0.32) 0.752 
Unemployment (%) 1.183 (0.82) 0.410 1.053 (0.23) 0.819 
Population (1000) 1.000 (-0.89) 0.372 1.000 (-1.63) 0.103 
Year fixed effects Y  Y  
Constant 4.747 (0.76) 0.445 141.3 (2.03) 0.042 
Observations 624  624  
Pseudo R2  0.154  0.214  
AIC 728.5  683.0  
BIC 839.4  798.3  
Note: Two-tailed p-values. Logit models. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 
if a state submits a lobbying report in a year, 0 otherwise. Models also include year 
dummies not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors are used (clustered at the state 
level). 
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Table III-7 Determinants of (ln) State Lobbying Spending (Including CA and PA as 
Dummies) 
 Model 9   Model 10   
 Coefficient 
(Robust SE) p-value 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) p-value 
Squire Index 25.608 (9.95) 0.010    
MDS 1    3.636 (1.01) 0.000 
MDS 2    3.146 (0.88) 0.000 
Gubernatorial election 
year -0.036 (0.80) 0.964 0.041 (0.78) 0.958 
Democrat governor 1.484 (2.15) 0.490 2.110 (2.07) 0.308 
Government liberal 
ideology -0.038 (0.08) 0.658 -0.055 (0.08) 0.496 
Citizen liberal ideology -0.103 (0.07) 0.122 -0.094 (0.06) 0.139 
Total expenditure 
($1000) 0.000 (0.00) 0.864 -0.000 (0.00) 0.666 
Fiscal health  -10.229 (5.32) 0.055 -9.132 (4.94) 0.065 
Federal transfer (%) -0.161 (0.13) 0.203 -0.098 (0.11) 0.396 
Debt burden (%) -0.053 (0.04) 0.190 -0.041 (0.03) 0.233 
Per Capita Personal 
Income ($1000) 0.130 (0.17) 0.445 0.019 (0.18) 0.914 
Unemployment (%) 0.645 (0.63) 0.306 0.285 (0.61) 0.639 
Population (1000) -0.000 (0.00) 0.945 -0.000 (0.00) 0.228 
CA -5.780 (3.19) 0.070 -18.177 (4.48) 0.000 
PA 2.274 (1.12) 0.042 -5.210 (2.42) 0.032 
Year fixed effects Y  Y  
Constant 8.489 (7.64) 0.267 17.295 (7.29) 0.018 
Sigma 7.098 (0.67) 0.000 6.871 (0.66) 0.000 
Observations 650  650  
Pseudo R2  0.045  0.055  
AIC 3389.872  3356.461  
BIC 3506.273  3477.339  
Note: Two-tailed p-values. Tobit models. The dependent variable the amount of money 
(logged) a state spends on lobbying in a year. Models also include year dummies not 
reported. Cluster-robust standard errors are used (clustered at the state level). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter examines how legislative professionalism affects state governments’ 
decision regarding lobbying the federal government. Theoretically, I point out that states 
with a higher level of legislative professionalism have stronger motivations to meet the 
demands of the median voters and more resources necessary for overcoming the 
transaction cost involved in the formal lobbying process. Therefore, legislative 
professionalism should have a positive impact on state lobbying participation and 
lobbying spending. Empirically, an analysis of a panel dataset covering 50 states from 
1999 to 2011 provides consistent support for the key arguments. 
This research has important implications for state politics literature, lobbying 
literature, and intergovernmental relations literature. Little state politics research 
quantitatively examines the lobbying activities of state governments, which is commonly 
viewed as an important means for subnational governments to obtain resources from the 
national government (Jensen 2018). Meanwhile, the federalism literature tells us how 
state governments make strategic choices to influence resource allocation of the federal 
government (Nicholson-Crotty 2015), but it missed an important link between state 
politics and federal resource allocation: state lobbying activities. My research applies the 
logic identified in the existing literature into state governments’ lobbying activities to 
understand how state-level political factors impact each state’s decisions regarding 
lobbying the federal government. To my knowledge, this work represents the first 
systematic analysis of the determinants of state lobbying activities on the supply side of 
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public goods. Future research may build on this work to further explore the effects of 
other potential determinants of state lobbying activities. 
This research also has important practical implications. Both the financial 
recessions in recent years and the trend of the aging population lead to an increase of 
state and local expenditures on Medicaid and on retirement benefits and the decrease of 
spending on transportation, education and other public services (Kiewiet and McCubbins 
2014; Nicholson-Crotty 2015). State governments have to pursue additional resources 
from the federal government to satisfy the demands of public goods in their jurisdictions. 
Hence, the dynamics behind each state’s investment in lobbying the federal government 
could help us understand which states will become the winners or losers in the “new 
fiscal ice age” (Kiewiet and McCubbins 2014). 
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CHAPTER IV  
BOTTOM-UP FEDERALISM OF FORMAL LOBBYING SPENDING 
Introduction 
Hundreds of local- and state-level governments invest millions of dollars in 
hiring professional lobbyists to influence the federal government each year. 
Nevertheless, only several recent studies have systematically examined the determinants 
of local government lobbying investments (Loftis and Kettler 2015; Goldstein and You 
2017). These studies show that local public goods demands are driving the lobbying 
participation or lobbying spending of local governments. However, there is little 
systematic analysis of the determinants of state government lobbying spending. Given 
that, presumably, both local- and state-level governments are hiring professional 
lobbyists to obtain resources from and influences policies in the federal government, an 
interesting question arises: Do local lobbying activities affect state-level lobbying 
activities? When local governments within states increase their investments in lobbying 
the federal government, will the state governments increase or decrease their 
investments in lobbying the federal government? 
This work borrows the concept of bottom-up federalism in policy diffusion 
literature to explain the vertical policy interaction in intergovernmental lobbying 
activities in the United States. According to Shipan and Volden (2006), bottom-up 
federalism refers to the process of local-to-state policy diffusion due to policy learning 
or policy pressures. In terms of policy learning, state-level policymakers may view local 
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governments as important information sources for searching for new policy instruments 
as local policies may signal political viability or policy effectiveness. With respect to 
policy pressures, local policies may change the pressures state policymakers received 
from interest groups, policy advocates, or the voters.  
Applying the logic of bottom-up federalism to the case of governmental 
lobbying, I point out that increasing local lobbying spending may have two distinct types 
of effects on state lobbying spending: the snowball effect and the pressure valve effect. 
Regarding the snowball effect, local lobbying spending may increase state lobbying 
spending through increasing the salience of lobbying as a policy tool, producing negative 
externalities among local governments, or escalating the competition for scarce federal 
funding between state and local governments. With respect to the pressure valve effect, 
local lobbying spending may decrease state lobbying spending by obtaining additional 
resources to successfully meet the demands of local voters and groups and, therefore, 
decreasing the policy pressures on state-level policymakers. While each argument seems 
to have its own merits and reasons, which one of the two hypothesized effects dominate 
the impact of local lobbying spending on state lobbying spending? 
Focusing on 50 states in the United States from 1999 to 2011, I use a dynamic 
panel data model to estimate the theoretical relationship. The results show that after 
controlling for political, financial, and demographic characteristics of states, there is 
consistent evidence that local government lobbying spending increases state government 
lobbying spending. Substantively, when local governments increase their spending on 
lobbying the federal government by 1000 dollars in a year, state governments will 
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increase their spending on lobbying the federal government by 69 dollars in the same 
year. 
This work contributes to our understanding of lobbying, policy diffusion, and 
intergovernmental relations. Previous quantitative intergovernmental lobbying research 
often focuses on how local governments allocate resources for lobbying the federal 
government, paying little or no attention to the potential effects of local lobbying 
investment on state lobbying investment (Goldstein and You 2017; Loftis and Kettler 
2015; Payson Forthcoming). Meanwhile, most diffusion research focuses on horizontal 
policy interdependency using regulatory policy cases (Graham, Shipan and Volden 
2013). Studies of the vertical interaction between state and local policies are still limited 
and we still know little about when and how local actions influence state actions 
(Shipand and Volden 2006). This work applies the bottom-up federalism theory to the 
case of intergovernmental lobbying by pointing out two distinct types of effects that lead 
to local-to-state diffusion. To my knowledge, this study represents the first systematic 
analysis of vertical policy interdependency in the process of intergovernmental lobbying. 
Future research can build on this work and explore the potential top-down or peer effects 
underlying government lobbying activities. 
 The next section briefly reviews the policy diffusion and lobbying literature and 
highlights the theoretical gaps in the existing research. Thereafter, I theorize the 
relationship between local and state lobbying spending by pointing out two distinct types 
of effects. I test the arguments by offering evidence based on dynamic panel models. I 
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conclude this study with a discussion on the contributions of this research and the 
potential directions for future research. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Policy diffusion refers to the process that the policy choice of one government is 
influenced by the policy choice of another government (Shipan and Voldne 2012; 
Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). Policy diffusion literature has examined two main 
categories of diffusion processes: horizontal and vertical processes. Horizontal policy 
diffusion processes, such as learning, competition, and imitation, received the most 
attention in previous literature (Gilardi 2010; Gray 1973, 1994; Shipan and Volden 
2008; Volden 2006; Walker 1969). Vertical dynamics in the subnational policy process, 
such as coercion mechanism, bottom-up and top-down federalism (Karch 2007, 2012; 
Karch and Rosenthal 2016; McCann, Shipan, and Volden 2015; Shipan and Volden 
2006), have also drawn increased attention from scholars in recent years. However, most 
of the previous diffusion studies investigate regulatory policy cases, which mainly deal 
with the interactions between governments and citizens. Nevertheless, besides citizens in 
their jurisdictions, governments also need to make policy decisions in terms of 
interacting with other governments. We still know little about the following question: Do 
decisions of intergovernmental interactions diffuse across governments?  
Using the case of intergovernmental lobbying activities, this works focuses on 
the potential effects of local governments’ decisions of lobbying the federal government 
on state governments’ decisions of lobbying the federal government. Particularly, I 
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borrow Shipan and Volden’s (2006) diffusion theory of bottom-up federalism to analyze 
the theoretical relationship between local lobbying spending and state lobbying 
spending. Shipan and Volden (2006) point out that most existing knowledge about 
intergovernmental policy dependency is about state-to-state diffusion, and little is known 
about the bottom-up diffusion of policies from local governments to state governments. 
They argue that policy-oriented learning and inter-locality economic or budgetary 
spillovers can lead state governments to change their existing policies. Using the case of 
anti-smoking laws, Shipan and Volden (2006) provide evidence that policies bubble up 
from city governments to state governments. 
This study seeks to bring together the intergovernmental lobbying literature and 
policy diffusion literature and argues that bottom-up federalism applies to the case of 
intergovernmental lobbying, too. I point out that the intensity of local governments 
lobbying the federal government may have two distinct types of impacts on the intensity 
of state governments lobbying the federal government: the snowball effect and the 
pressure valve effect (Shipan and Volden 2006). 
There are three possible sources of the snowball effect. First, the increase of local 
lobbying activities makes this policy tool more salient to state-level policymakers, which 
increases state lobbying spending. Recent research suggests that states tend to draw 
policy experience and knowledge within each policy area from the local governments 
(Shipan and Volden 2006, 2014). Meanwhile, previous research published in top 
Economics and Political Science journals suggests that lobbying can generate substantial 
returns. For instance, 1 dollar spent on lobbying produces more than 8 dollars in the 
 88 
 
education sector (De Figueiredo 2006 ), 1.3 dollars in the energy sector (Kang 2016), 12 
dollars in stock market (Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta 2016), and 40 dollars for city 
governments (Goldstein and You 2017). Given this potential profitability of lobbying 
investment, a higher level of local investment in lobbying the federal government is 
more likely to attract the attention of state-level policymakers and lead them to invest 
more money in lobbying the federal government. 
Second, local lobbying activities can produce negative externalities among local 
governments. For instance, one local government’s lobbying investment may reduce a 
nearby city’s likelihood of obtaining the same resources (e.g., earmark or grant) from the 
federal government. As Payson (Forthcoming) suggests, the benefits of 
intergovernmental lobbying are positively associated with the own-source revenue per 
capita of cities. More local governments’ spending on lobbying the federal government 
may lead to a more unequal distribution of resources. Therefore, state governments may 
internalize this externality by increasing their own lobbying spending and directly pursue 
resources from the federal government to meet the demands of local interest groups and 
voters.  
A third possible source of snowball effect is the unaligned political incentives of 
state and local policymakers. Given different constituencies, state and local 
policymakers may simultaneously pursue the same limited resources from the federal 
government to meet the demands of their separate core supporters. As Jensen (2016) 
points out, state governments often compete with local governments for federal funding, 
too. Given this adversarial rather than collaborative relationship between state and local 
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policymakers’ interests, there may be an arms race in terms of lobbying investments, 
too.  
Snowball Effect Hypothesis: The intensity of local lobbying spending is 
positively associated with the intensity of state lobby spending. 
However, as Shipan and Volden (2006) suggest, local policy actions may 
produce an opposite effect on state-level policymakers, the pressure valve effect. 
Specifically, local lobbying actions may decrease state lobbying spending by decreasing 
the policy pressures on state-level policymakers. If local lobbying spending can help 
local governments successfully pursue additional resources from the federal government 
and provide local communities with more public goods (Goldstein and You 2017; 
Payson Forthcoming), local policy issues may become less acute and local voters and 
groups have fewer incentives to advocate further actions at the state level. Meanwhile, 
state-level policymakers will feel fewer policy pressures to be responsive to local 
demands. Therefore, state-level policymakers will be less likely to allocate resources for 
lobbying the federal government to directly respond to their local supporters.  
Pressure Valve Effect Hypothesis: The intensity of local lobbying spending is 
negatively associated with the intensity of state lobby spending. 
Both of the snowball and pressure valve effect hypotheses seem to have their 
own reasons derived from the competing theoretical explanations. To empirically 
examine which one dominates in the process of bottom-up federalism of 
intergovernmental lobbying, I further employ empirical data drawn from multiple 
sources to conduct hypothesis testing. 
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Data Analysis 
This chapter examines the bottom-up federalism of intergovernmental lobbying 
investments by focusing on the lobbying spending of state and local governments from 
1999 to 2011. I collect the state and local lobbying spending data by scraping the 
information falling under the category of Civil Servants/Public Officials on the website 
of the Center for Responsive Politics.36 The dependent variable is the amount of money 
each state government spends on lobbying the federal government each year. The 
independent variable is the sum of lobbying spending by all city, town, and county 
governments within a state in a year.37,38  
Admittedly, local and state governments may lobby for different policy issues at 
the federal level. Nevertheless, if we assume that policymakers are motivated by 
reelection or reappointment, then the purpose of lobbying the federal government for the 
36 Center for Responsive Politics. “Civil Servants/ Public Officials.” 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=W03 Date accessed: April 2, 2018. 
37 Another potential measure of local lobbying activities is the proportion of state population 
with local governments participating in lobbying the federal government (Shipan and Volden 
2006). However, intergovernmental lobbying is not a regulatory policy that aims to directly 
change citizens’ behaviors and the geographic area of towns, cities and counties may overlap, 
and, therefore, this potential measure cannot reflect the intensity of the overall local lobbying 
investment. Also, an empirical difficulty is that the yearly population information for small cities 
and towns is less available and may be less reliable (Shipan and Volden 2008). Given these 
reasons, I also do not measure the state lobbying activities as a dummy indicating each state’s 
participation in lobbying the federal government to maintain the measurement consistency of the 
independent and dependent variables. Nevertheless, a logit model with year fixed effects (not 
reported) does show that local lobbying spending has a statistically significant effect on states’ 
participation in lobbying the federal government. 
38 This measure only includes local general-purpose governments. It does not include the 
lobbying information of special districts, school districts, or public hospitals, because these 
institutions may not have the same theorized effects as the general-purpose governments and 
their lobbying information is much more difficult to identify or collect. 
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state- and local-level governments should be the same: obtaining more resources or 
policy supports from the federal government to meet the demands of supporters. Even if 
a state government lobbies the federal government for policy supports for a state-level 
policy issue that is different from local policy issues, the returns of lobbying should still 
serve the same purpose of improving the quality or quantity of public goods. Local 
lobbying investments can still increase the salience of or decrease the demand for 
lobbying among state policymakers. Therefore, although I do not have the information 
on issue-specific lobbying spending for each level of government,39 the potential 
difference of lobbying issues should not threaten the theoretical or empirical inferences. 
State lobbying investments are also likely to be influenced by other factors that 
we need to control for. Building on previous research on state politics (Berry and Berry 
1990; Shipan and Volden 2006), I mainly include political, financial, and demographic 
controls in the models. I use the two-dimensional indices developed by Bowen and 
Greene (2014) based on the approach of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) to measure 
legislative professionalism. The first dimension (MDS 1) represents the broad 
differences between amateur and professional legislatures. The second dimension (MDS 
2), by contrast, represents the differences between a support-intensive (high staff support 
and short sessions) versus work-intensive (low staff support and long sessions) 
legislatures. Compared to the one-dimensional Squire Index (Squire 2017), Bowen and 
                                                
39 It is hard to collect information on issue-specific lobbying spending because the number and 
type of policy issues is inconsistent across lobbying reports and I cannot directly identify the 
specific amount of lobbying spending assigned to each issue. This fact makes it difficult to 
consistently calculate a government’s issue-specific lobbying spending or compare two different 
governments’ lobbying spending in a specific policy area in a year. 
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Greene’s two-dimensional measures can more comprehensively capture the 
commonality and variation of legislative professionalism across the states.  
As one of the most important goals of state politicians is to be reelected, the 
proximity of state elections is often associated with the likelihood of adopting a policy 
(Besley and Coate 2003; Nicholson-Crotty 2015). Therefore, I include a dummy 
indicating a Gubernatorial election year in the models. The Gubernatorial election 
information is collected from the Governors Dataset created by Carl Klarner.40 
Political scientists have proposed partisan and ideological explanations for state 
government spending, too (Nicholson-Crotty 2015). The partisan theory suggests that 
the governing party tends to spend money on policies that satisfy core constituencies. As 
the core supporters and members of the Democratic Party are assumed to prefer the 
expansion of public service, I expect that state lobbying spending increases with state 
elite liberalism. Specifically, I set a dummy equal to 1 if a governor is a Democrat, and 0 
otherwise. I also include a measure of government liberal ideology drawn from Berry et 
al. (2010) in the models.41 By contrast, the electoral theory suggests that politicians are 
likely to manipulate government spending to buy the median votes. Accordingly, I also 
include a measure of citizen liberal ideology drawn from Berry et al. (2010) in the 
models. 
                                                
40 Klarner, Carl, 2013, "Governors Dataset." Source: https://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/20408, 
Harvard Dataverse. Date accessed: October 5, 2018. 
41 Richard C. Fording. 2018. “State Ideology Data.” https://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-
ideology-data/ Date accessed: October 5, 2018. 
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The financial characteristics of state government can potentially affect their 
lobbying spending. For instance, the size of government expenditure, fiscal health,42 the 
percentage of federal transfer, and the percentage of debt burden can be positively or 
negatively correlated with a state government’s lobbying spending. The information on 
these variables is collected from The Government Finance Database (Pierson, Hand, and 
Thompson 2015).43 
Similarly, the demographic characteristics can potentially affect the resources or 
motivations of state governments, thus shaping their lobbying spending. I choose to 
include the per capita personal income, percentage of unemployment, and population 
size in the models, as these variables are most likely to shape the demands of public 
goods in each state. The data are collected from the websites of the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis44 and the Bureau of Labor Statistics45. The summary statistics of all variables 
are reported in Table IV-1. 
Given the panel data structure, I employ the Arellano-Bond dynamic model to 
use current and past information to predict state lobbying spending. This generalized 
method of moments (GMM) approach uses first differencing to remove the unobserved 
                                                
42 This measure is calculated using the following equation: (!"#$% !"#"$%"!!"#$% !"#!$%&'()!)!"#$% !"#!$%&'()!  (Berry and Berry 1990). 
43 Kawika Pierson, Michael L. Hand, and Thompson. “The Government Finance Database.” 
Source: http://willamette.edu/mba/research-impact/public-datasets/index.html Date accessed: 
September 4, 2018. 
44 Bureau of Economic Analysis. “Regional Economic Accounts: Downolad.” Source: 
https://apps.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm Date accessed: September 5, 2018 
45 Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Civilian Noninstitutional Population and Associated Rate and 
Ratio Measures for Model-Based Areas.” Source: https://www.bls.gov/lau/rdscnp16.htm Date 
accessed: September 5, 2018. 
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panel-level effects and use instruments (e.g., the lagged dependent variable and 
endogenous variables) to produce moment conditions (Arellano and Bond 1991). A test 
for the serial correlation structure rejects no autocorrelation of order 1 (z=-2.34) and 
cannot reject no autocorrelation of order 2 (z=0.60). Accordingly, there is evidence that 
the Arellano-Bond model assumptions are satisfied.46  
 
 
 
Table IV-1 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
State lobbying 
spending ($1000) 650 174.59 293.09 0.00 2100.00 
Local lobbying 
spending ($1000) 650 1042.28 2359.79 0.00 19920.24 
MDS 1 650 0.15 1.65 -1.85 8.58 
MDS 2 650 0.13 0.75 -3.07 3.17 
Gubernatorial 
election year 650 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Democrat governor 650 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Government liberal 
ideology 650 47.53 14.27 17.51 73.62 
Citizen liberal 
ideology 650 51.71 15.80 8.45 95.97 
Total expenditure 
($1000) 650 30140.35 37195.94 2271.67 285238.10 
Fiscal health  650 0.04 0.18 -0.76 1.25 
Federal transfer (%) 650 26.72 8.09 12.32 101.18 
Debt burden (%) 650 55.41 30.98 13.83 245.51 
Per Capita Personal 
Income ($1000) 650 34.84 7.04 20.73 63.77 
Unemployment (%) 650 5.61 2.09 2.30 13.70 
Population (1000) 650 5901.77 6484.42 491.78 37672.65 
 
                                                
46 Enrique Pinzon. “xtabond cheat sheet.” The STATA Blog. Source: 
https://blog.stata.com/2015/11/12/xtabond-cheat-sheet/. Date accessed: October 1, 2018 
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Empirical Results 
To demonstrate the relationship between local and state lobbying spending in 
each state from 1999 to 2011, I first calculate the prediction for state lobbying spending 
from a linear regression of state lobbying spending on local lobbying spending and plot 
the resulting line, along with a 95% confidence interval in Figure IV-1. The results 
reveal that there is generally a positive correlation across most states. I next conduct the 
regressions below to further examine the robustness of these relationships. 
Table IV-2 presents the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimation of state 
lobbying spending. The coefficients, robust standard errors, and two-tailed p values are 
reported. I run two regressions altogether. Model 1 includes only the lagged dependent 
variable and the variables that capture the political, financial and demographic 
characteristics of each state, whereas in Model 2, the key independent variable, local 
lobbying spending  ($1000), is added.  
The results in Table IV-2 suggest that local lobbying spending has a statistically 
significant impact on state lobbying spending. Substantively, when local lobbying 
spending within a state increases by 1000 dollars, the state lobbying spending increases 
by 69 dollars. This positive effect is statistically significant (p<0.05) after controlling for 
multiple political, financial, and demographic variables and serial correlation. Therefore, 
Table IV-2 provides supportive evidence for the snowball effect hypothesis in 
intergovernmental lobbying activities. 
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Figure IV-1 Linear Prediction of Bottom-Up Federalism in Intergovernmental 
Lobbying 
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In this GMM model, the control variables show some interesting results too. 
Substantively, Table IV-2 shows that when a state government increases its total 
expenditure by 1000 dollars, it will decrease its lobbying spending by 6 dollars. This 
result suggests that governments with a higher level of total expenditure might have 
fewer resources to be allocated for lobbying the federal government. One percentage 
increase in the federal transfer is associated with a 3,566 dollars increase in state 
lobbying spending. This result suggests state governments that receive more federal 
transfer might be more actively seeking to obtain additional resources from the federal 
government. One percentage increase in debt burden, however, is associated with a 
2,345 dollars decrease in state lobbying spending. One percent increase in the 
unemployment rate is associated with a 7,221 dollars increase in state lobbying 
spending.  
However, the effects of legislative professionalism are positive but statistically 
insignificant. This is reasonable since legislative professionalism is stable during the 
observation period and the theoretical effects of legislative professionalism on state 
lobbying spending are probably not linearly additive. Therefore, the estimation of the 
effect of legislative professionalism in a dynamic panel-data model with a non-log-
transformed dependent variable maybe less efficient. Following Shipan and Volden 
(2006), I also test the interaction effects between legislative professionalism and local 
lobbying spending. The results (not reported here) are positive but not statistically 
significant. Moreover, there is no strong evidence to confirm the potential effects of 
other political, financial, and demographic controls. 
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Table IV-2 Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel-Data Estimation of State Lobbying 
Spending 
  Model 1  Model 2   
  
Coefficie
nt 
(Robust 
SE) 
Two-
tailed p 
value 
Coefficient 
(Robust 
SE) 
Two-
tailed p 
value 
Local lobbying spending 
($1000) 
  0.069 
(0.03) 0.031 
Lagged State lobbying 
spending ($1000) 
0.683 
(0.06) 0.000 
0.657 
(0.06) 0.000 
MDS 1 55.869 (73.80) 0.449 
47.598 
(68.91) 0.490 
MDS 2 14.482 (54.68) 0.791 
11.083 
(51.76) 0.830 
Gubernatorial election year -10.418 (8.04) 0.195 
-11.151 
(7.60) 0.143 
Democrat governor -19.293 (53.59) 0.719 
-3.071 
(54.52) 0.955 
Government liberal ideology 1.423 (1.91) 0.456 
0.940 
(1.96) 0.631 
Citizen liberal ideology 2.658 (1.68) 0.114 
1.792 
(1.35) 0.185 
Total expenditure -0.004 (0.00) 0.013 
-0.006 
(0.00) 0.001 
Fiscal health ($1000) 66.707 (50.51) 0.187 
51.108 
(50.99) 0.316 
Federal transfer (%) 3.993 (1.94) 0.039 
3.566 
(2.11) 0.090 
Debt burden (%) -2.153 (0.80) 0.007 
-2.345 
(0.87) 0.007 
Per Capita Personal Income 
($1000) 
-2.048 
(3.11) 0.511 
-2.549 
(3.38) 0.450 
Unemployment (%) 5.868 (3.88) 0.130 
7.221 
(3.81) 0.058 
Population (1000) 0.068 (0.03) 0.042 
0.005 
(0.04) 0.896 
Constant 
-369.907 
(213.15) 0.083 
89.981 
(251.98) 0.721 
Observations 550  550 
 Wald Chi2 1728.17  1431.82  
Note: Two-tailed p-values. The dependent variable the amount of money a state spends 
on lobbying in a year (1000s).  
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Conclusion 
Intergovernmental policy dependency has drawn increasing attention from 
economics, political science, public administration and public policy scholars in recent 
years (Graham, Ship and Volden 2013). Researchers have provided abundant evidence 
to illustrate the patterns of state-to-state and national-to-state policy dependency. 
However, there is much less research on local-to-state policy influence. Meanwhile, 
previous quantitative lobbying research mainly focuses on how private groups lobby the 
government, only several recent research has tried to quantitatively identify the 
determinants of intergovernmental lobbying using systematic evidence. Nevertheless, 
existing quantitative research on intergovernmental lobbying rarely examines the 
lobbying activities of state governments. 
In this chapter, I present evidence that local-to-state diffusion exists in 
intergovernmental lobbying. This research generalizes Shipan and Volden’s (2006) 
argument of bottom-up federalism to the area of intergovernmental lobbying. Following 
Shipan and Vodlen (2006), I point out that two distinct types of effects can lead to 
bottom-up federalism in intergovernmental lobbying: the snowball effect and the 
pressure valve effect. Local lobbying spending may produce the snowball effects on 
state lobbying spending through increasing the salience of lobbying as a policy tool, the 
negative externalities among local governments, or escalating the competition for scarce 
federal funding between state and local governments. Local lobbying spending, 
however, may also produce the pressure valve effect on state lobbying spending by 
successfully reducing the policy demands and policy pressures from local voters and 
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groups. My empirical analysis based on 50 states from 1999 to 2011 shows that when 
local government lobbying spending increases, state lobbying spending increases, too. In 
other words, the snowball effect rather than the pressure valve effect dominates the 
process of bottom-up federalism in intergovernmental lobbying. 
My analysis points to several directions for future research. Limited by data 
availability, this work does not differentiate between the effects of the multiple 
mechanisms behind the snowball effect. In other words, although this chapter provides 
evidence to suggest that bottom-up federalism exists in intergovernmental lobbying, we 
still do not know whether state governments respond to local governments because of 
proactive learning or passive response to policy pressures. Future researchers may use 
the methods of survey or interviews to obtain more first-hand information from the 
intergovernmental lobbying process to disentangle these mechanisms.  
Moreover, bottom-up federalism may be more applicable to some lobbying 
issues than other lobbying issues. The future research with more fine-grained 
information may test bottom-up federalism of lobbying decisions in various specific 
policy areas to isolate different bottom-up diffusion mechanisms. Finally, this chapter 
has attempted to examine only one aspect of the state lobbying process: lobbying 
investment. Although the evaluation of state lobbying impact is beyond the scope of this 
study, this issue is clearly the next logical step to be taken in the study of state lobbying 
activities.  
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CHAPTER V  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The vast research literature on lobbying seeks to explain the origins, strategies, 
content, and consequence of lobbying activities among private interest groups (De 
Figueiredo and Richter 2014). However, the process of intergovernmental formal 
lobbying is often ignored. Given the fact that hundreds of subnational governments 
spend tens of millions of dollars on formally lobbying the federal government each year 
and these lobbying investments probably have significant impacts on national politics, a 
systematic analysis of intergovernmental formal lobbying process is theoretically and 
practically important. 
To improve our understanding of intergovernmental formal lobbying, this 
dissertation mainly consists of three independent quantitative essays identifying and 
testing determinants of intergovernmental lobbying activities on the supply side of 
public goods. Chapter II points out that, compared to cities with political executives, 
cities with professional executives have a longer time horizon and more policy and 
administration expertise and, therefore, have more incentives to allocate resources for 
lobbying the federal government. An analysis of 1, 259 largest cities between 1999 and 
2012 suggests that, after controlling for political, financial, and demographic 
characteristics, executive institutions still significantly predict city lobbying participation 
and lobbying spending. Chapter II represents the first institutional analysis of the 
motivations and resources of government executives during intergovernmental lobbying. 
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Chapter III focuses on how state governments lobby the federal government. 
Chapter III points out that more professional state legislatures are more likely to 
represent the preferences of the median voters and have more time, staff, and 
discretionary resources necessary for facilitating the formal lobbying process. Using a 
panel dataset covering 50 states from 1999 to 2011, I find that legislative 
professionalism has a statistically significant impact on state lobbying participation and 
lobbying spending. Chapter III represents one of the first quantitative analyses of state 
government lobbying activities. 
Chapter IV further analyzes how local lobbying investments impacts state 
lobbying investments. Borrowing the concept of bottom-up federalism from the policy 
diffusion literature, I argue that more local lobbying spending can lead to more or less 
state lobbying spending through a snowball effect or a pressure valve effect. A dynamic 
panel data model of 50 states from 1999 to 2011 shows that when local governments 
increase their investments in lobbying the federal government by 1000 dollars, state 
governments increase their investments in lobbying the federal government by 69 dollars 
in the same year. This finding suggests that the snowball effect dominates the process of 
bottom-up federalism in intergovernmental lobbying. Chapter IV represents the first 
systematic analysis of bottom-up federalism in the case of intergovernmental lobbying. 
This dissertation makes multiple contributions to the existing literature. First, 
different from previous demand-based explanations, such as ideological divergence or 
public demands (Goldstein and You 2017; Loftis and Kettler 2015), this dissertation 
provides the first attempt to establishing a theoretical logic that associates the 
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institutional motivations or constraints of policymakers on the supply side of public 
goods with the activities of intergovernmental lobbying. The exploration of the factors 
underlying the process of intergovernmental lobbying could help us understand why 
some local governments obtain more federal resources than others. Thus, my research 
could help researchers form a deeper understanding of the role of intergovernmental 
lobbying in democratic representation and federalist governance. Moreover, following 
the approach of the recent quantitative intergovernmental lobbying research, my work 
paves the way for rigorous statistical analysis of the impact of subnational institutions on 
intergovernmental lobbying decisions in view of the inherent limits of most of the 
existing anecdotal or case studies (Jensen 2018). 
Second, this dissertation contributes to research on intergovernmental relations 
and federalism. There is a long-standing debate on the structure of intergovernmental 
relations in the United States. Three models of intergovernmental relations have been 
proposed (Wright 1978): the coordinate-authority model in which subnational 
governments are independent of the national government and operate with their own 
autonomy; the inclusive-authority model in which the subnational government are just 
dependents of the national government; the overlapping-authority model in which 
different tiers of governments are interdependent and intergovernmental interactions 
follow a bargaining authority pattern instead of an autonomic or hierarchic pattern. As 
subnational governments tend to lobby the federal government to obtain a larger slice of 
the federal budget or contracts, my research provides support for the overlapping-
authority model by revealing how subnational governments interact or cooperate with 
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the federal government through lobbying. Moreover, my exploration of the multiple 
levels of subnational governments’ participation and investment in intergovernmental 
lobbying can provide the scholarly foundations for future efforts of identifying the 
origins of intergovernmental relations. 
Third, this work also contributes to the study of urban politics, state politics, and 
public management. This dissertation advances the existing literature by showing that 
urban and state institutional structures could significantly shape governmental lobbying 
decisions, and may have broader implications regarding local and state financial 
allocation process. Moreover, public management scholars tend to view 
intergovernmental networking as an important determinant of public organization 
performance (O’Toole and Meier 1999; Meier and O’Toole 2001). However, little 
research has discussed the origins of managerial networking in public administration 
(Rabovsky and Rutherford 2016). As federal lobbying spending is an objective measure 
of government managerial networking, this dissertation also sheds some new light on the 
explanations for managerial networking in public administration research. 
 Fourth, the patterns of intergovernmental lobbying identified in this dissertation 
could be potentially generalized to other contexts. Generally, in countries with a 
multiple-level power structure, the distribution of various types of resources along 
government hierarchy tends to be imbalanced, and the upper-level governments often 
have limited information on local demands. Under this circumstance, the lower-level 
governments have incentives to lobby the upper-level governments for additional 
resources. Studying the dynamics and mechanisms of these activities could not only 
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improve the academic knowledge of government behaviors but also help practitioners 
employ this knowledge to promote or revise certain institutional designs to address 
social injustice issues produced by the unequal allocation of national resources (Bae and 
Feiock 2004). 
There are multiple possible directions for future research. First, although the 
quantitative chapters have pointed out multiple theoretically plausible mechanisms 
underlying the main hypotheses, some of them cannot be directly empirically verified 
given the current data or resource limit. For example, due to the lack of an established 
individual-level executive database of thousands of American cities in the past decades, 
it is difficult to directly verify whether all political executives have a shorter time 
horizon or less policy administration training or experience than professional executives. 
There is also not enough information to systematically analyze the effects of local 
executive expertise or state legislative professionalism on the change of transaction costs 
during the intergovernmental lobbying process. Moreover, it is empirically difficult to 
determine whether state government lobbying spending responds to local lobbying 
spending because of the increasing salience of lobbying as a policy tool, the negative 
externality of local lobbying activities, or the increasing competition between state and 
local governments for the scarce federal funding. Researchers with more resources or 
funding may build on this dissertation to further verify or develop these theoretical 
mechanisms in the future. 
Also, we still know little about whether, how and why governmental interest 
groups behave differently from private interest groups during the lobbying process. 
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Where public ownership has been considered, however, it is only treated as a rival 
explanation to control for, rather than as the focus of the analysis (De Figueiredo and 
Silverman 2006). As a result, the role of public ownership in the lobbying literature has 
been underdeveloped. Yet, institutional ownership may determine each actor’s 
participation motivation and constraints in the lobbying process and their decisions to 
lobby. The following questions, therefore, merit examination in future research: Is the 
process of governmental lobbying different from private interest groups lobbying? How 
and why? 
Moreover, the characteristics of a policy issue can have a significant impact on 
the actors involved in the policy process (Hayes 1981; Lowi 1972). For example, 
lobbyists may play different roles in the distributive, constituent, regulative, or 
redistributive policy sectors. Also, although previous research suggests that lobbying 
agenda tends to be significantly different from the congressional agenda (Baumgartner et 
al. 2009), the salience of a policy issue on the congressional agenda should at least 
partially determines the importance of an issue on the lobbying agenda. Therefore, future 
research with fine-grained information on issue-specific lobbying spending can further 
examine whether issue characteristics matter and whether the effects of institutions vary 
under different circumstances.47  
                                                
47 The Collaborative Research Project on Lobbying and Policy Advocacy in the US Federal 
Government provides a random sample of in-depth case studies on issue-specific lobbying 
activities, which might be a good start for gaining insights before conducting quantitative 
analysis. Source: http://lobby.la.psu.edu/issues.html Date accessed: April 5, 2018. 
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Finally, understanding how lobbying works in practice can help complement the 
quantitative analysis by adding traction to the causality underlying the statistical data 
analysis. With enough resources or funding, field observations and qualitative interviews 
with the leaders of subnational governments and professional lobbyists should be 
encouraged (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Jensen 2018; Nownes 2006). As the US-style 
formal lobbying is not necessarily popular or legal in other contexts, comparative studies 
of formal or informal lobbying activities with cases from other countries can help 
produce insights that are otherwise ignored.48 
 
                                                
48 See Kennedy (2009) as an example from China. 
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